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INTRODUCTION
Since 2006, the Supreme Court has been reviving a longdormant and little-defined First Amendment exception: the exception for “speech integral to criminal [or tortious] conduct.”1
The leading case cited as support for that exception, Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co. (1949),2 hadn’t been cited by the
Court at all from 1991 to 2005. Since 2006, the Court has
cited Giboney six times.3 “Speech integral to criminal conduct”
is now a standard item on lists of First Amendment
exceptions.4
The Court has used this exception to justify prohibitions
on distributing and possessing child pornography,5 on soliciting crime,6 and on announcing discriminatory policies.7 Lower
courts have used it to justify restrictions on speech that informs people how crimes can be committed;8 on doctor speech
that recommends medical marijuana to their clients;9 on union
speech that “retaliates” against union members by publicly
criticizing them for their complaints;10 on intentionally distressing speech about people;11 and more.12 Government agencies
have used the exception to justify restrictions on, among other
things, the publication of bomb-making instructions,13 speech
1
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion);
see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27 n.5 (2010); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460, 468–69 (2010); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008); Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006). Rumsfeld v. FAIR makes clear that the
Court views the exception as also applicable to speech integral to civilly actionable
conduct. See 547 U.S. at 62.
2
336 U.S. 490 (1949).
3
See supra note 1.
4
See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (plurality opinion); Stevens, 559 U.S.
at 468–69; United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 2014); Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1248 n.6 (Mass. 2015).
5
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982).
6
Williams, 553 U.S. at 297.
7
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62.
8
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 1997).
9
Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001); Conant v.
McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1997); see also Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 20, Walters v. Conant, 540 U.S. 946 (2003) (No. 03-40) (arguing that
the revocation of a physician’s registration for recommending that patients use
marijuana does not violate the First Amendment). But see Conant v. Walters, 309
F.3d 629, 637–38 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding such speech constitutionally
protected).
10
See, e.g., Dixon v. Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 83–84 (1st Cir.
2007).
11
See infra Part III.B.1.
12
See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2013).
13
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING INFORMATION 15–16, https://web.archive.org/web/20120113134329/http://www.
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by tour guides,14 and offensive speech by protesters near a
highway.15
The Court has offered “speech integral to [illegal] conduct”
as one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech” excluded from First Amendment protection.16 But if
this exception is indeed to be well defined and narrowly limited,
courts need to explain and cabin its scope. This Article—the
first, to my knowledge, to consider the exception in depth17—
aims to help with that task.
In the process, the Article observes several things, both
about the current state of the law and how it evolved:
1. The “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” exception,
though largely dormant during the late Burger Court and the
Rehnquist Court, was very important in the early decades of
free speech law, and has roots going back to the 1910s.18 The
Court saw it as connected not just with the law of solicitation
and conspiracy but also with the law of fighting words and
threats.19 The limits on what constitutes punishable incitement, from the Holmes and Brandeis post-World War I dissents
to Brandenburg v. Ohio20 and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,21
were attempts to chart the boundaries of this doctrine.
2. This exception was also central to Justice Black’s (and,
to some extent, Justice Douglas’s) supposedly “absolutist” vision of the First Amendment.22 Justice Black’s distinction between conduct and speech was closely linked to the view that
some speech that causes or threatens illegal conduct should
itself be treated as a form of conduct.
justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bombmakinginfo.html [https://perma.cc/
63JT-WMEG].
14
Brief for Appellee District of Columbia at 23, Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Nos. 13-7063 & 13-7064).
15
Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 29, Ovadal v. City of Madison, 416 F.3d
531 (7th Cir. 2005).
16
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)). Even Kent Greenawalt’s leading extended work on
speech and crime mentions Giboney only in a footnote. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH,
CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 247 n.12 (1992).
17
Before the recent Giboney revival, my own earlier article discussed and
criticized Giboney. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable
Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1314–26 (2005). But now that the
“speech integral to [illegal] conduct” exception seems firmly entrenched, the important question is how the doctrine should be understood.
18
See infra Part I.A.1.a.
19
See infra Parts I.B, I.D.
20
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
21
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
22
See infra text accompanying notes 143–45.
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Indeed, though Justices Black and Douglas famously rejected First Amendment exceptions for obscenity, libel, and
incitement, they had no problems with exceptions for fighting
words, solicitation, and threats.23 The “integral to [illegal] conduct” exception helps explain that position.24
3. The history of the exception also helps explain its revival
during the Roberts Court. Over several cases, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Scalia have been articulating a vision of
the First Amendment in which the exceptions to protection are
not the product of “categorical balancing” by the Court,25 but
are rather supposed to be found in history and tradition.26
Given this, the Justices have to answer a question: how to
explain existing exceptions that the Justices do not reject but
that (unlike, say, libel, obscenity, fighting words, and incitement) aren’t solidly historically established? This is a similar
question to the one that Justices Black and Douglas had to
answer: how to explain existing exceptions that those Justices
did not reject, but that look like they should be rejected under
their absolutist test? The answer Justice Black gave is that the
“speech integral to illegal conduct” doctrine left room for such
exceptions.27
The Court is now returning to that same doctrine, armed
with that doctrine’s historical provenance, and seeking the
same thing: an umbrella that can cover restrictions on speech
23

See infra text accompanying notes 136–42.
Justice Black’s approach may have been unsound in general, and it was
definitely unsound in particular applications. Justice Black erred, I think, in
joining a dissenting opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), that rested
on the proposition that Cohen’s jacket was “mainly conduct and little speech.” Id.
at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Likewise, I think Justice Black was mistaken in
rejecting First Amendment protection for symbolic expression. See Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 610 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Giboney for the
proposition that flag burning is constitutionally unprotected); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)
(same as to the wearing of an armband); Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and
the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1057–63 (2009)
(collecting evidence that the treatment of symbolic expression as tantamount to
verbal expression dates back to the Framing era).
My point in this Article, though, is simply that Justice Black’s approach
makes more internal sense if one sees the Giboney opinion as central to that
approach.
25
See GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 223–24 (arguing that First Amendment
exceptions develop through “categorical balancing”); Melville Nimmer, The Right to
Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 942-45 (1968) (same).
26
See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012); Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460
(2010).
27
See infra text accompanying note 184.
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such as child pornography, solicitation, threats of discrimination, and the like. Labeling such speech “conduct”—or, as
Justice Douglas tended to call it, speech “brigaded” with conduct28—helps avoid (or, in the view of cynics, conceal) more
thoroughgoing balancing.
4. But the historical “speech integral to illegal conduct”
doctrine—together with its links to the threats and fighting
words exceptions—was not just a convenient safety valve to
protect what would otherwise be an excessive absolutism.
Rather, it was consistent with a particular understanding of
free speech, which one might call a “rule-of-law” model of
speech.
Under this model, people have to be free to advocate for
changes in the law, the economy, and society, and to use social
and economic pressure to push for such changes. But people
must comply with valid laws that regulate nonspeech conduct.
And they must also avoid speech that helps cause illegal conduct, or that threatens to commit illegal conduct.
Given that speech sometimes both constitutes advocacy of
social change and helps cause illegal conduct, the question is
where the rule of law calls for the line to be drawn. In many
ways, that was the question that the Court was facing during
Justice Black’s tenure, and that Justice Holmes was struggling
with in his shifting free speech votes from 1911 to 1927.
5. The Giboney opinion and the ones that followed it, especially in the 1950s, were not clear in their scope. That is unsurprising, since the Court was then just beginning to develop
free speech doctrine, and since the more libertarian Justice
Black wing of the Court was struggling with the more prorestriction Justice Frankfurter wing. And precedents since the
1960s have cut back on some of the broader implications of
Giboney and its earlier progeny.29
6. Given all these precedents, the best understanding of
the “integral to illegal conduct” exception is this:
(a) When speech tends to cause, attempts to cause, or
makes a threat to cause some illegal conduct (illegal
conduct other than the prohibited speech itself)—such
as murder, fights, restraint of trade, child sexual abuse,
28
See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 398 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 42 n.6 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29
See infra Part II.
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discriminatory refusal to hire, and the like—this opens
the door to possible restrictions on such speech.
(b) But the scope of such restrictions must still be narrowly defined, in order to protect speech that persuades
or informs people who will not engage in illegal conduct. That some category of speech was historically
unprotected, because it causes or threatens illegal conduct, does not tell us where the boundaries of the exception should be drawn. The history of the incitement
and fighting words doctrines, for instance, shows the
Court narrowing the historically unprotected zone (as
the Court has done with regard to some of the historical
exceptions that aren’t tied to other illegal conduct, such
as the obscenity and libel exceptions).
In a sense, then, the Giboney doctrine should be seen less as
a single exception than as a guide to generating other exceptions. For instance, Giboney cited cases authorizing punishment for advocacy of illegal conduct and for insulting speech as
involving speech integral to illegal conduct.30 But while the
risk of illegal conduct posed by such speech has indeed led the
Court to recognize First Amendment exceptions (for incitement
and fighting words), the Court has been careful to define those
exceptions separately and narrowly, to protect potentially valuable speech.31
Likewise, the child pornography exception has been explained as an application of the Giboney principle, because
distribution and possession of child pornography helps cause
criminal production of child pornography.32 But there, too, the
Court has made clear that not all speech that creates a market
for criminally obtained speech (for instance, for unlawful interception of cell phone calls) is constitutionally unprotected.33
7. On the other hand, the Giboney doctrine can’t justify
treating speech as “integral to illegal conduct” simply because
the speech is illegal under the law that is being challenged.
That should be obvious, since the whole point of modern First
Amendment doctrine is to protect speech against many laws
that make such speech illegal. Yet many lower courts have
indeed cited Giboney for the proposition that speech loses its
protection just because it is made illegal—for instance, when
30
31
32
33

See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra

text accompanying note 72.
Part I.B.1.
Part I.C.1.
Part I.C.2.
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some courts have upheld laws restricting professionals’ (such
as psychotherapists’) speech to their clients.34
Giboney has thus become, at times, a tool for avoiding
serious First Amendment analysis—a way to uphold speech
restrictions as supposedly fitting within an established exception, without a real explanation of how the upheld restrictions
differ from other restrictions that would be struck down. To
avoid such misuse of Giboney, we need to understand the limitations on the Giboney doctrine.
8. Relatedly, Giboney can’t justify treating speech as “integral to illegal conduct” even when the speech violates a law that
equally forbids both conduct and speech (usually a law that
bars conduct that produces, is intended to produce, or is likely
to produce a certain result).35 The Court has recently made
clear, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,36 that even generally applicable laws are subject to strict scrutiny when they
apply to speech because of the harm assertedly caused by its
content.37 Moreover, when Giboney was decided, the Court
had already so held in several other leading cases—and continued to do so in many leading cases between Giboney and
Holder.38
I am not a fan of the “speech integral to illegal conduct”
exception,39 but it seems to be here to stay. The question is
what it does—and should—cover.
I
WHAT “SPEECH INTEGRAL TO [ILLEGAL] CONDUCT” MEANS:
THE SUPREME COURT CASES
Let us begin by canvassing what the “speech integral to
illegal conduct” exception covers, according to the Supreme
Court precedents. I’ll begin by surveying the precedents, and
then offer a summary of the rule and its function in Parts I.G
and I.H.

34
35
36
37
38
39

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part II.A.
561 U.S. 1 (2010).
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Parts II.A.2–5.
See Volokh, supra note 17, at 1314–26.
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A. Speech That Tends to Cause Illegal Conduct by
Soliciting Its Commission
1. Lack of Constitutional Protection
a. The 1910s Cases: Gompers, Fox, Frohwerk,
Abrams
Ever since the Court began to seriously consider protecting
free speech, it has had to ask: what happens when speech
tends to bring about crime—for instance, when it solicits
crime?
The Court’s “clear and present danger” test, for all its flaws,
was an attempt to distinguish protected advocacy from unprotected criminal solicitation. Justice Holmes expressly relied on
the solicitation analogy in Frohwerk v. United States: “We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any
other competent person then or later, ever supposed that to
make criminal the counselling of a murder within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional interference
with free speech.”40
Holmes stood by this even when he shifted to a generally
more speech-protective approach in Abrams v. United States:41
“I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that
would justify punishing persuasion to murder,” he wrote, “the
United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger
that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils.”42
And Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Whitney v. California, which
Justice Holmes joined, likewise acknowledged that advocacy of
illegal conduct may be punished when it constitutes “incitement” that “would be immediately acted on,”43 or an “attempt”
or “conspiracy.”44
40
249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919); see also GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 126–29.
Even Zechariah Chafee, who disagreed with the Frohwerk decision, seemed to
likewise think that criminal solicitation was punishable. See Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 948 (1919) (apparently
endorsing “ordinary standards of criminal solicitation and attempt”).
41
250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42
Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43
274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Brandeis ultimately concurred in the judgment in Whitney because he concluded that
there was enough evidence of “a conspiracy, on the part of members of the International Workers of the World, to commit present serious crimes; and likewise to
show that such a conspiracy would be furthered by the activity of the society of
which Miss Whitney was a member.” Id. at 379.
44
Id. at 378.

R
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Likewise, Justice Holmes reasoned in Schenck v. United
States—immediately following the “falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic” line—that free speech “does not
even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words
that may have all the effect of force,” citing Gompers v. Buck
Stove & Range Co. (1911).45 And Gompers, an opinion that
Justice Holmes had joined, likewise involved speech that, in
the Court’s view, solicited illegal conduct: speech that called on
union members to engage in what was seen as unlawful restraint of trade by boycotting a company.46
Another early Justice Holmes free speech opinion, Fox v.
Washington (1915),47 was likewise framed as being about solicitation. Fox upheld a conviction for violating a ban on speech
that “encourag[es a] . . . breach of law.”48 Jay Fox was an
anarchist, a trade unionist, and, most relevant here, a nudist.
He was involved in a community called Home, where, among
other things, many people walked around naked, in violation of
Washington public nudity laws. When some people complained, he published an article in the newspaper he edited
(The Agitator) condemning the complainants, defending a boycott of the complainants, and more generally defending Home’s
nudist practices.49
The Court upheld Fox’s conviction. The statute, Holmes
reasoned, should not be read as banning speech that simply
“tend[s] to produce unfavorable opinions of a particular statute” but rather as limited to speech urging criminal violation of
the law.50 Individual “encouragements . . . directed to a particular person’s conduct” would have been criminal under the
common law, Holmes argued.51 The statute, he concluded,
simply extended this common-law prohibition to “publication[s]” distributed “to a wider and less selected audience.”52
Fox’s speech, like the speech in Gompers, Schenck, and
Frohwerk may well be protected today. But at the time it was
seen as closely related to the illegal conduct it urged (a form of
45
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citing Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 439 (1911)).
46
221 U.S. at 438–39.
47
236 U.S. 273 (1915).
48
Id. at 276–77.
49
For more on Fox and Justice Holmes’s approach in the case, see THE
FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH CHRONICLE AND READER 187–90 (Ronald K. L.
Collins ed., 2010).
50
Fox, 236 U.S. at 277.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 277–78.
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“verbal act[ ],” the Gompers Court called it53), likely because it
was understood to solicit a specific criminal act at a specific
place or time—or, in Gompers or in the Frohwerk “counselling
of a murder,” with a specific victim.
The line between punishable solicitation and protected
condemnation of a law (perhaps including even protected advocacy of violating the law) has moved over the last century. But
the Court’s cases, from Gompers, Fox, Schenck, and Frohwerk
through Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams, the 1960s civil
rights cases,54 Brandenburg v. Ohio,55 and the recent United
States v. Williams56 criminal solicitation decision, have been
attempts to draw this line.
b. Giboney as a Solicitation Case
On its facts, then, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.57
was an easy case for the Court. Indeed, it was unanimous, and
got the votes of First Amendment maximalists (such as its author, Justice Black, as well as Justice Douglas) and strong
union supporters.
Giboney arose in a time when many people didn’t have
refrigerators, or didn’t have freezers in their refrigerators. If
you wanted ice, you would buy ice from an ice peddler, who
would buy the ice from a wholesale ice distributor. The Ice and
Coal Drivers and Handlers union wanted to unionize the ice
peddlers, but many peddlers refused to join.58
To pressure the nonunion peddlers, the union picketed
Empire Ice & Storage, the peddlers’ supplier, demanding that it
agree to stop supplying them.59 Unionized truckers abided by
the picket line, and refused to deliver goods to Empire. Empire’s business fell 85%.60
What the union demanded that Empire do, though, would
have been a crime under Missouri law, which forbade, among
other things, “any . . . combination . . . or understanding . . . in
53

Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911).
As late as 1965, Justice Goldberg’s majority opinion in Cox v. Louisiana
described Giboney as supporting the proposition that “[a] man may be punished
for encouraging the commission of a crime.” 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965) (citing Fox
and Giboney).
55
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
56
553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55
(1982) (likewise stating that solicitation, as “an invitation to engage in an illegal
exchange for private profit,” may be prohibited).
57
336 U.S. 490 (1949).
58
Id. at 492.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 493.
54
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restraint of trade or competition in the . . . sale of any product.”61 Empire therefore sued, and won: the “sole, unlawful
immediate objective” of the picketing “was to induce Empire to
violate the Missouri law by acquiescing in unlawful demands to
agree not to sell ice to nonunion peddlers,” the Court concluded, citing Fox v. Washington62 in the same paragraph.63
Because of this, “appellants were doing more than exercising a
right of free speech or press. They were exercising their economic power together with that of their allies to compel Empire
to abide by union rather than by state regulation of trade.”64
To be sure, the union’s speech did more than just solicit
crime: it tried to economically pressure the employer into committing the crime. But if ordinary solicitation of a specific
crime by a specific entity (the employer) against specific victims
(the nonunion peddlers)—“please commit this crime”—is punishable, then coercive solicitation, “commit this crime or we’ll
ruin your business,” must be at least as punishable.
In the following years, Giboney was repeatedly applied to
solicitation of a related crime: picketing aimed at pressuring an
employer to force employees to join a union, when state law
forbade such employer action.65 And more generally, Giboney
has been cited for the proposition that picketing can be restricted when it is “directed at an illegal end,”66 in the sense of
soliciting a crime.

61

Id. at 491 n.1.
236 U.S. 273 (1915).
63
Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502.
64
Id. at 503 (citation omitted).
65
See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); United Ass’n
of Journeymen Plumbers & Steamfitters v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 193 (1953);
Bldg. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 533, 541 (1950); see also
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 481 (1950) (Minton, J., dissenting)
(characterizing Giboney as involving picketing aimed at pressuring the picketed
company to violate the law); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 469 (1950)
(Reed, J., concurring) (likewise).
66
Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
314 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); see also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1972) (“States may sometimes proscribe
expression that is directed to the accomplishment of an end that the State has
declared to be illegal . . . .” (citations omitted)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
454 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the government may prohibit
“picketing for an unlawful objective”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 571
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing the Frohwerk “counselling
of a murder” line as expressing the “same doctrine” approved of by Giboney).
62
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c. Expressly Recognizing a Solicitation Exception:
United States v. Williams
This link between the “speech integral to criminal conduct”
doctrine and solicitation of crime thus dates back to the 1900s.
But the Court has also reaffirmed it just in the last decade: in
2008, the Court cited Giboney in United States v. Williams,67
which officially recognized a criminal solicitation exception to
the First Amendment (there, in the context of an offer to distribute illegal child pornography).
“Offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically
excluded from First Amendment protection,” the Court held,
citing Giboney as authority.68 And offers, as the Court noted,
are a form of solicitation—“offers to provide” contraband solicit
listeners to commit unlawful receipt of contraband, while “requests to obtain contraband,” which the Court viewed as similarly punishable, solicit listeners to commit unlawful
distribution of contraband.69
2. Limitations on the Exception
But while the Court has held that some advocacy of crime
is punishable, there must be limits on any advocacy-of-crime
exception. Some recognized this as early as the 1870s: Francis
Wharton’s criminal law treatise, for instance, reasoned that too
broad a view of solicitation would “greatly infringe[ ]” the “necessary freedom of speech and of the press.”70 The Holmes and
Brandeis dissents, of course, also acknowledged this. And
since the 1960s, the Court has gone far in upholding the right
to advocate crime generally.71
“Counselling of a murder,” in the sense of urging someone
to kill a specific person, likely remains punishable solicitation,
as Williams suggests. But counseling murder in the sense of
urging killing in the abstract (whether of capitalists, police of67

553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008).
Id.
69
Id.
70
2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
850 (7th ed. 1874).
71
See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969); see also Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 111–26 (discussing solicitation
in more detail). I greatly respect Greenawalt’s work in this area, but I think his
focus on “situation-altering utterances” is unsound, for reasons discussed in
Volokh, supra note 17, at 1326–36.
68

R

R
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ficers, thieves, or whoever else) is now constitutionally
protected.72
Indeed, as noted above, Fox v. Washington would likely no
longer be good law. Today, the Washington statute, even if
read as limited to speech “encouraging [a] . . . breach of the
[law],”73 would be unconstitutionally overbroad under Brandenburg v. Ohio. Setting aside fairly specific solicitations,
aimed at particular victims or particular criminal actions,
speech that advocates crime can only be punished if it is intended to and likely to cause imminent criminal conduct.74
And this illustrates an important principle, to which we will
return repeatedly below: the decision that some speech is sufficiently related to criminal conduct—and is thus potentially
constitutionally unprotected—can only be the start of the analysis. The decision may justify restricting some speech that, for
instance, urges criminal conduct. It may justify an exception
even to a Justice who generally thinks the First Amendment
should provide absolute protection (Justice Black in Giboney)
or to Justices who think First Amendment exceptions should
be limited to traditionally recognized categories (such as the
majority in Williams, most of whom endorsed the traditionbased view two years later in Stevens75). But the Court still has
to decide which such speech is punishable, and may decide
that the exception should reach only a narrow range of such
speech.
During much of the 1900s, the Court was struggling with
this very question. Justice Holmes in Abrams seemed to draw
the line at purpose—speech said with the purpose of promoting
violation of the law would be punishable (at least so long as the
danger was “clear and imminent”). Speech said with a good
motive would be unpunishable, even if the effect of the speech
might be to lead some listeners to commit crimes.76
In the 1950s, the test appeared to become that “advocacy
of abstract doctrine,” even of criminal conduct, was constitu72
Under Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447, and Hess, 414 U.S. at 108–09, such
speech is unprotected only if it is intended to and likely to promote imminent
illegal conduct, as opposed to conduct at some unspecified time in the future.
73
Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 275 (1915).
74
See supra note 72.
75
The Williams majority consisted of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito. United States v. Williams, 553
U.S. 285, 287 (2008). All those Justices were still on the Court when Stevens was
decided, and all but Alito were in the Stevens majority. United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 463 (2010).
76
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).

R
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tionally protected (again, even if it could cause such conduct),
but “advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action” was unprotected.77 Indeed, the Court in Yates v. United States
recharacterized the precedents from Fox and Schenck onwards
as reflecting that line.78 Brandenburg and Hess v. Indiana
redrew the line at speech intended to and likely to cause imminent lawless conduct.79 United States v. Williams, however,
acknowledged that some speech may be punished as solicitation when it refers to a specific enough crime, likely even when
the contemplated crime is set for a specified future, non-imminent time.80
This line-drawing was at times focused on whether speech
was so temporally or spatially close to the proposed crime that
it is “integral” to it.81 But ultimately, the limits on the incitement doctrine likely flowed from the recognition (to which we
will return below) that suppressing advocacy of crime may have
two effects, not just one.
First, such suppression may, as intended, prevent communication to those listeners who will be persuaded to commit
crime. But second, such suppression may also prevent communication to other listeners who will use the speech as a basis
for lawful action. Even Justice Frankfurter, who took a fairly
narrow view of speech protections, acknowledged this:
[S]peech is seldom restricted to a single purpose, and its
effects may be manifold . . . . [C]oupled with . . . advocacy [of
the overthrow of the Government by force] is criticism of defects in our society. . . . It is a commonplace that there may
77

Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957).
Id. (“The distinction between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy
directed at promoting unlawful action is one that has been consistently recognized in the opinions of this Court, beginning with Fox v. Washington and Schenck
v. United States.” (citations omitted)).
79
See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
80
553 U.S. 285 (2008).
81
See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“Speech is closely brigaded with action when it triggers a fight,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, as shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded theater triggers a
riot.” (citation omitted)); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 456–57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (characterizing “falsely shout[ing] fire in a crowded theatre” as punishable
“speech . . . brigaded with action” because the speech and the action are “inseparable and a prosecution can be launched for the overt acts actually caused”); Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 296–97 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the speech in that case did not “form[ ] an essential part of a
course of conduct which the State can regulate or prohibit,” in part because there
was insufficient “proximity of picketing to conduct which the State could control
or prevent”).
78

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN403.txt

996

unknown

Seq: 16

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

5-MAY-16

8:28

[Vol. 101:981

be a grain of truth in the most uncouth doctrine, however
false and repellent the balance may be.82

Moreover, as Justice Frankfurter likewise recognized,
Suppressing advocates of overthrow inevitably will also silence critics who do not advocate overthrow but fear that
their criticism may be so construed. No matter how clear we
may be that the defendants now before us are preparing to
overthrow our Government at the propitious moment, it is
self-delusion to think that we can punish them for their advocacy without adding to the risks run by loyal citizens who
honestly believe in some of the reforms these defendants advance. It is a sobering fact that in sustaining the convictions
before us we can hardly escape restriction on the interchange
of ideas.83

Justice Frankfurter generally believed that it was up to legislatures to weigh the crime-prevention benefits of restrictions on
speech that advocates crime against the burdens that these
restrictions impose on debate among the law-abiding.84 But
the Court eventually rejected that position, most clearly in
Brandenburg (which built on Justices Holmes’s and Brandeis’s
rejecting that position in Gitlow85 and Whitney86). Even speech
that advocates crime, the Court concluded, is generally protected, unless it intentionally advocates likely imminent crime;
broader restrictions, even limited to intentional advocacy of
crime, the Court concluded, are too restrictive of legitimate
debate.87
In this respect, the “speech integral to criminal conduct”
exception is similar to other exceptions, such as obscenity and
libel. The historical pedigree of those exceptions may have
helped lead to their continuing existence.88 But the Court has
worked hard to clarify and narrow the historical scope of the
exceptions, so as to minimize the risk that they would suppress
constitutionally valuable speech.89 The same has been true
82
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 549 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
86
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J, concurring).
87
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
88
See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482–84 (1957) (relying on
history to determine that “unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was
not intended to protect every utterance”).
89
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (setting forth an
obscenity test that, for all its flaws, was much more speech-protective than obscenity law had historically been before the 1950s).
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with regard to advocacy of crime. We will see that it has also
been true with regard to the other exceptions recognized under
the rubric of “speech integral to [illegal] conduct.”
B. Speech That Tends to Cause Illegal Conduct by
Provoking Retaliation
1. Lack of Constitutional Protection
Justice Black’s opinion in Giboney also suggests that another traditionally recognized exception, fighting words, fits
within the Giboney principle. “[I]t has never been deemed an
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of
conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,” the
opinion says—and cites as support not just Fox v. Washington
but also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the leading fighting
words case.90 A later opinion, Cox v. Louisiana, likewise cites
Chaplinsky alongside Giboney as an example of a situation
where “conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or
prohibited.”91
And this is unsurprising. The fighting words exception is
structurally similar to the solicitation exception. Both involve
speech that tends to cause crime. Both, though justified as
involving a “course of conduct,” can actually lead to criminal
liability even for standalone statements. In both, the concern
is that the speech will cause criminal conduct by someone else.
Moreover, Chaplinsky itself characterized the fighting words
statute as “punishing verbal acts”92—a similar formulation to
Giboney’s “illegal” “course of conduct . . . carried out by means
of language.”93
Indeed, Justice Black consistently accepted the fighting
words exception, despite his absolutist rhetoric. Near the start
of his time on the Court, he joined the Chaplinsky opinion.
Near the end of his life, he joined Justice Blackmun’s dissent in
Cohen v. California, which cited Chaplinsky favorably.94 In between, he joined opinions that would have entirely rejected the
90
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (citing
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S.
273 (1915)).
91
379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965) (citing Giboney, 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
92
315 U.S. at 574.
93
Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502.
94
403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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obscenity exception,95 the libel exception (at least as to matters
of public concern),96 and the incitement exception.97
But he never expressed any doubt about the fighting words
exception. The citation of Chaplinsky in Giboney suggests that
he viewed fighting words as likewise “integral to criminal
conduct.”98
2. Limitations on the Exception
At the same time, the fighting words exception, like the
solicitation exception, is sharply limited. Not all speech that
tends to cause crime, whether because it advocates criminal
conduct or because it provokes retaliatory criminal conduct, is
constitutionally unprotected. The Court has made clear that
much potentially retaliation-provoking speech is protected, in
Terminiello v. Chicago,99 Edwards v. South Carolina,100 Gregory
v. City of Chicago,101 and Cohen v. California.102 And though
Justice Black dissented in Cohen, he voted to protect such
speech in Terminiello, Edwards, Gregory, and Feiner v. New
York.103
The connection between the speech and conduct, in Justice Black’s view (and the Court’s view), simply opened the door
to carving out a limited exception under which sufficiently lowvalue speech could be restricted. The connection didn’t itself
justify restricting all speech for which the connection could be
shown.
The chief reason for this, as with advocacy of illegal conduct, is that speech can both risk causing unlawful attacks on
the speaker by some listeners and enlighten or inform other
listeners. And, as with solicitation, this becomes especially
clear as the audience grows beyond just one addressee.
It seems unlikely that the marshal whom Chaplinsky was
insulting would have been much informed or persuaded by the
insults. But when Terminiello gave his speech and Cohen wore
his jacket, they were communicating to many potentially willing, persuadable listeners as well as to some who were likely
95

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring).
97
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
98
See supra note 72.
99
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
100
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
101
394 U.S. 111 (1969).
102
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
103
340 U.S. 315 (1951).
96

R
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only to be offended and angered. That helps explain why
speech that is not “directed to the person of the hearer”104 is
generally excluded from the fighting words doctrine (even when
such speech might potentially cause a violent reaction among
some hearers).
C. Speech That Tends to Cause Crimes by Creating an
Incentive to Commit Crime
1. Lack of Constitutional Protection
New York v. Ferber, the case that recognized a child pornography exception, relied in part on Giboney:
The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an
economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the
production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout
the Nation. “It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to
speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 498 (1949).105

And while this was only one of the rationales the Court gave in
Ferber, it has recently become the Court’s principal explanation for the constitutionality of bans on distributing child
pornography.
In United States v. Stevens, the Court concluded that the
First Amendment exceptions should be limited to the historically recognized ones, such as for libel, obscenity, and the
like.106 Yet the Court had recognized child pornography as a
First Amendment exception,107 even though this exception
lacks a longstanding historical pedigree. The Court’s explanation in Stevens was that the child pornography exception constitutes just an instance of the broader Giboney exception:
Ferber presented a special case: The market for child pornography was “intrinsically related” to the underlying abuse, and
was therefore “an integral part of the production of such
materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation.” As we
noted, “[i]t rarely has been suggested that the constitutional
freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech
or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a
104
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940)).
105
458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
106
559 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2010).
107
See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504
(1984) (listing libel, fighting words, incitement, obscenity, and child pornography
as parallel First Amendment exceptions).
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valid criminal statute.” Id., at 761-762 (quoting Giboney).
Ferber thus grounded its analysis in a previously recognized,
long-established category of unprotected speech . . . .108

This connection between the child pornography exception
and the Giboney doctrine could be criticized. Among other
things, the distribution (and, even more so, possession109) of
child pornography is often quite far removed from the underlying criminal abuse of the child in time and in place. The distributors and possessors often have no direct connection to the
initial abusers. Calling the distribution and possession “an
integral part of the production” strains the term “integral” in
some measure. And unlike solicitation, aiding and abetting,
threats, and the like, speech that is the fruit of a crime has not
itself long been seen as criminally punishable.110
Nonetheless, the connection may be sufficient, precisely
because the existence of the market for child pornography does
indeed help cause the production of further child pornography
(and thus the abuse of children involved in this production).
Like solicitation and fighting words, the distribution of child
pornography is strongly causally linked to a particular crime, a
crime that does not itself consist of otherwise protected
speech.111
2. Limitations on the Exception
The incentive-to-commit-crime cases also resemble the solicitation cases in another way: the connection to crime doesn’t
suffice to strip all such speech of protection, but just opens the
door to recognizing a First Amendment exception.
This was made particularly clear in Bartnicki v. Vopper,
which, like Ferber, involved a causal link between a punishable
crime and speech.112 In Bartnicki, federal law banned interception of cellular telephone conversations, a ban that is broadly
assumed to be constitutional.113 The same law also banned
108

559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010) (citations omitted in part).
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990), held that private possession of
child pornography was also criminally punishable, and cited Giboney (via Ferber)
in the process.
110
Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 115–18 (1991) (holding that speech describing a crime is constitutionally
protected).
111
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236 (2002) (distinguishing
actual child pornography from simulated child pornography on the grounds that
actual child pornography in Ferber “had what the Court in effect held was a
proximate link to the crime from which it came”).
112
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
113
Id. at 520–21.
109
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the publication of any such intercepted conversations, even by
downstream recipients who weren’t involved in the
interception.114
In this respect, as the dissent pointed out, the distribution
ban was much like the ban on distributing child pornography.
The intercepted material, like child pornography, was the fruit
of an underlying crime. Allowing its distribution, like allowing
distribution of child pornography, created an incentive to commit the crime.115
Yet the majority held that the publication ban was unconstitutional, at least as to speech on matters of public concern.
“Although there are some rare occasions in which a law suppressing one party’s speech may be justified by an interest in
deterring criminal conduct by another, see, e.g., New York v.
Ferber, this is not such a case.”116 “In cases relying on such a
[Ferber] rationale,” the Court reasoned, “the speech at issue is
considered of minimal value”;117 and indeed, Ferber relied at
least as much on the low value of the speech as on the connection to crime. Likewise, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia concluded that even if leaks of confidential judicial
conduct proceedings are punishable, the publication by downstream recipients of such links is protected.118
Not all speech that advocates crime is constitutionally unprotected; the relevant exceptions are the solicitation exception
and the incitement exception, both of which are much narrower than the category of all advocacy of crime. Likewise, not
all speech that is the fruit of crime is constitutionally unprotected—the relevant exception, at least so far, seems to be just
the child pornography exception.
Moreover, the constitutional distinction is not based on a
judgment about how close or how distant the forbidden speech
(distribution of information illegally recorded by third parties or
distribution of child pornography illegally created by third parties) is from the criminal conduct (the illegal recording or the
illegal underage sexual conduct). In both Ferber and Bartnicki,
114

Id. at 520.
Id. at 551–52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
116
Id. at 530 (citation omitted in part).
117
Id. at 530 n.13.
118
435 U.S. 829, 837–38 (1978). The Pentagon Papers case, New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), also in practice freed newspapers to
publish even illegally leaked speech; but it technically settled only the freedom
from injunctions against such publications, and didn’t resolve whether the government might be able to criminally punish newspapers that published such
material. See id. at 733 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
115
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the defendants’ speech was equally distant from the third parties’ criminal conduct.119
Rather, the rationale for the distinction stems from the
noncriminal value of the speech. In the child pornography
cases, as Ferber and Bartnicki noted, distributing and possessing child pornography helped cause crime and also had very
little First Amendment value. But in cases such as Bartnicki
and Landmark Communications, publishing illegally intercepted or leaked material helped cause future illegal conduct
(by creating an incentive for it to take place) but also helped
inform the public about important matters.120
Thus, the Court’s conclusion in United States v. Stevens
that “[w]hen we have identified categories of speech as fully
outside the protection of the First Amendment, it has not been
on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis”121 is indeed limited to the process of identifying First Amendment exceptions
in the first place. The Court was unwilling to come up with an
“animal-cruelty-depicting speech” exception in Stevens, or a
“violence-depicting speech” exception in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.122 But once an existing exception
is in play, the value of speech is often relevant to defining the
scope of the exception.
We see that in the Court’s libel case law.123 We see it in the
obscenity test.124 And we see it in the decisions under the
“integral part of unlawful conduct” exception. Whether speech
that is connected to unlawful conduct can be punished turns
on how valuable the speech is.
Much advocacy of crime is protected because of its potential value to noncriminal listeners, despite its tendency to
cause crime by some other listeners.125 Much offensive speech
to the public is protected because of its potential value to willing listeners, despite its tendency to cause some offended listeners to criminally attack the speaker.126 And much
119
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 519 (2001); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 752 (1982).
120
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534; Landmark Commc’ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 839 (1978).
121
559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010).
122
131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
123
See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
755–57 (1985) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing speech on matters of public
concern from speech on matters of private concern for libel law purposes).
124
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (limiting obscenity law to
speech that lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”).
125
See Volokh, supra note 17, at 1290.
126
See id. at 1304.
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publication of illegally created, intercepted, or leaked material
is protected because of its potential value to listeners, despite
its tendency to stimulate such illegality in the future.
D. Threats of Illegal Conduct
1. Lack of Constitutional Protection
Giboney is also connected to the First Amendment exception for true threats. When the Giboney opinion said that
speech “used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave
offense against an important public law” may be restricted,127
two of the cases it cited in support were about the lack of
protection for threats.128 And Giboney has in turn been cited
as support for the proposition that threats are constitutionally
unprotected.129
The Court first considered the threats exception in cases
involving speech about unionization. Companies are generally
barred from firing employees for voting for a union, and unions
are generally barred from retaliating against employees for
their speech.130 The Court therefore concluded that speech
that threatens unlawful retaliation is itself unlawful. The
Court so held as to employer speech, reasoning that “conduct,
though evidenced in part by speech, may amount, in connection with other circumstances, to [unlawful] coercion”:131
The mere fact that language merges into a course of conduct
does not put that whole course without the range of otherwise applicable administrative power. In determining
whether the Company actually interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees, the Board has a right to look at
what the Company has said, as well as what it has done.132

Shortly afterwards, the Court held that the same principle applied to union speech threatening members with illegal retalia127

336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537–38 (1945); Va. Elec. & Power Co.
v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 539, 549 (1943) (noting that the employer’s speech was
punishable because it was threatening); NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S.
469, 478–80 (1941) (discussing the threats in more detail in an earlier
proceeding).
129
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (citing one of the
labor threat cases, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), as an example of the Giboney doctrine).
130
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3), 158(b)(1)(A), 158(b)(2)
(2012).
131
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. at 477.
132
Id. at 478.
128
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tion.133 And the Court also suggested the same with regard to
union threats of illegal conduct more broadly.134
To be sure, most of the Court’s threats cases since then
have framed the threats exception as a separate exception, not
as a special instance of Giboney. But one of the later employer
threats cases, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. (1969),135 was characterized by a 1978 Court decision as an example of the
Giboney principle.136 And one of the Court’s recent citations to
Giboney—Rumsfeld v. FAIR (2006)137—likewise fits within the
“threat of illegal conduct” rubric.
Rumsfeld v. FAIR offered this example as an illustration of
the Giboney principle:
Congress, for example, can prohibit employers from discriminating in hiring on the basis of race. The fact that this will
require an employer to take down a sign reading “White Applicants Only” hardly means that the law should be analyzed
as one regulating the employer’s speech rather than
conduct.138

And “White Applicants Only” is a threat of tortious conduct
(illegal discrimination). Someone who isn’t white and sees the
sign will know that, if he takes the time and effort to apply for
the job, he will get nothing except a humiliating rejection. As a
result, he won’t apply for the job.
An analogy might be the tort law that bars anyone from
ousting a tenant from land that he has leased, at least unless
the tenant violates the terms of the lease. If a landlord (or
anyone else) locks a tenant out of the property that the tenant
has leased, he is committing a tort.139 If a landlord instead
tells the tenant, “If you come onto the property, you’ll find that
you are locked out,” he is committing the same tort, even if the
tenant doesn’t bother coming to the property and checking

133

Thomas, 323 U.S. at 537–38 (citing Va. Elec. & Power Co.).
See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 277 (1941) (suggesting that threatening an illegal strike in the event a court held a particular way might be constitutionally unprotected, though threatening a legal strike was constitutionally
protected).
135
395 U.S. 575 (1969).
136
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
137
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
138
Id. at 62.
139
See, e.g., Willcut v. Stout, 670 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 6.1, illus. 6 (AM. LAW INST.
1977).
134
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whether his key still works.140 (Say this is a vacation home and
the tenant is out of town, so trying to go on the property and
finding himself locked out will be expensive.)
Threatening the tenant with unlawful exclusion from the
property is unprotected speech, because it is a threat of tortious conduct. The same is true for threatening potential applicants with unlawful exclusion from consideration for a job.
2. Limitations on the Exception
The Court has not squarely dealt with the threats exception in much detail. Indeed, the Court hasn’t even resolved
whether statements are punishable only (a) if the speaker intends to put a person in fear, or whether it is enough that (b) a
reasonable speaker would realize that the statement would put
a person in fear.141 The Court has said that, to be punishable,
a threat of illegal conduct must be a “true threat,” rather than
obvious hyperbole or humor, but that is more just a reminder
that threats must indeed be threatening.
Lower courts, however, have begun to deal with how specific and concrete a threat must be to be punishable. Some
courts, for instance, have required that the threat be “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent
prospect of execution.”142 “One day we’ll revolt”—or even “one
day there’ll be a revolution and the capitalists will be the first
ones up against the wall”—likely would be constitutionally protected. So would “no justice, no peace,” even when the “no
peace” threatens unspecified violence in the future, as a means
of pressuring listeners into going along with the speaker’s demands. At the same time, despite the “immedia[cy]” and “imminen[ce]” requirement, presumably a threat to do something
140
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 6.1, illus.
16 (noting that landlord’s making property unavailable to tenant, when the tenant
knows of this, equals wrongful eviction of tenant).
141
In Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), the Supreme Court
initially agreed to consider the matter but ultimately decided the case on purely
statutory grounds. The federal threats statute, the Court held, required a minimum mens rea of either recklessness or knowledge (the Court didn’t decide which
it was), not mere negligence. Id. at 2012–13. Elonis’s conviction, which was
based on jury instructions that only required negligence, thus had to be reversed
without the need to decide what the First Amendment required. The circuit split
on the constitutional mens rea question—what is the minimum mens rea that the
First Amendment requires for a threat conviction?—thus remains unresolved.
142
New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue Nat’l, 273 F.3d 184, 196 (2d
Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976));
see also State v. Krijger, 97 A.3d 946, 960 n.11 (Conn. 2014) (endorsing this test);
State v. Chung, 862 P.2d 1063 (Haw. 1993) (likewise).
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specific at some time in the future (e.g., “if you vote to form a
union, we’ll fire you,” even when the vote won’t be for some
months) would still be punishable.
Likewise, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. suggests that
at least some statements made as part of a political movement
remain constitutionally protected even if they may appear to be
threats and are said against a backdrop of violence. In Claiborne, the NAACP organized a black boycott of white-owned
stores and publicized the names of blacks who weren’t following the boycott, to pressure people into going along with the
boycott.143 Some of the people whose names were so publicized were beaten, had their property vandalized, or had shots
fired into their homes.144
Charles Evers, an NAACP leader, gave two speeches in
which he “stated that boycott violators would be ‘disciplined’ by
their own people and warned that the Sheriff could not sleep
with boycott violators at night.”145 And it seems likely that
black citizens who didn’t want to go along with the boycott
might have understandably felt threatened with violence; indeed, such a reaction might have been intended:
While many of the comments in Evers’ speeches might have
contemplated “discipline” in the permissible form of social
ostracism, it cannot be denied that references to the possibility that necks would be broken and to the fact that the Sheriff
could not sleep with boycott violators at night implicitly conveyed a sterner message. In the passionate atmosphere in
which the speeches were delivered, they might have been
understood as inviting an unlawful form of discipline or, at
least, as intending to create a fear of violence whether or not
improper discipline was specifically intended.146

But the Court held that the speech didn’t qualify as punishable
incitement to violence (surely correct under Brandenburg), and
then concluded without much further analysis that it was constitutionally protected, notwithstanding its potentially threatening message.147 The holding of Claiborne with regard to
threats is thus unclear, and has led to some confusion among
lower court judges.148
143

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 903–04 (1982).
Id. at 904.
145
Id. at 902.
146
Id. at 927.
147
See id. at 928–29.
148
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am.
Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (splitting 6 to 5 on
144
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E. Agreements to Commit Crime—and Other Agreements
1. Lack of Constitutional Protection
Agreements to commit a crime or tort, such as traditional
conspiracy, would fit neatly within the Giboney principle,
alongside solicitation, provocation, or threats of illegal conduct,
or the use of the fruits of illegal conduct.149
Giboney, however, has often been cited to support the constitutionality of laws that ban agreements to do something,
even when that something itself would not have been independently criminal or tortious. Antitrust law is a classic example.150 An agreement to set high prices violates antitrust law,
even though simply setting a high price on one’s own is perfectly legal. Prostitution is another example: agreeing to have
sex in exchange for valuable consideration is prostitution, even
though giving (and accepting) a gift following sex is legal.
And though agreements are often labeled “conduct” rather
than speech, they are indeed communication. An agreement is
essentially a communication that the speaker intends to do
something under certain circumstances, and intends to be
morally or legally bound to do it, generally coupled with a communication from the other party that the other party agrees to
the proposed deal.
The communication can be nonverbal, with the proverbial
wink and a nod that the parties understand because of their
shared knowledge and expectations. But one way or another,
agreement stems from communicated intentions. Nor can one
say that the communication is just evidence of the agreement.151 Before the communication happens, all we have are
whether speech by antiabortion activists qualified as sufficiently threatening to be
constitutionally unprotected, notwithstanding Claiborne).
149
See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949); see
also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982) (“Although agreements to engage
in illegal conduct undoubtedly possess some element of association, the State
may ban such illegal agreements without trenching on any right of association
protected by the First Amendment. The fact that such an agreement necessarily
takes the form of words does not confer upon it, or upon the underlying conduct,
the constitutional immunities that the First Amendment extends to speech.”);
GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 79–88.
150
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011) (citing Giboney
for the proposition that antitrust law is constitutionally permissible); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (likewise); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof.
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697 (1978) (likewise).
151
Speech can be used as evidence of some other crime, or of a motive that
makes certain other conduct criminal. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476, 489 (1993); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641–42 (1947). The torts
and crimes discussed in this Article, though, involve speech itself being made
illegal.
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desires and intentions in the prospective parties’ heads. It is
the communication that itself creates the agreement.
Still, agreements have long been seen as a regulable communication: “the very plot is an act in itself.”152 That’s true of
agreements that are seen as criminal or tortious. And it’s true
of other agreements that create various legal obligations; many
normal contracts qualify. A statute might, for instance, require
various disclosure obligations for certain kinds of agreements,
and impose civil penalties (such as lack of enforceability) when
those obligations aren’t complied with. That is a constitutionally valid regulation of the agreement, even though the burden
on speech—you can’t say “I promise to X” unless you also say
something else—is quite deliberate.
Here, I think the better explanation is simply this: (a)
Agreements are a longstanding category of speech that has
been historically excluded from constitutional protection. (b)
Such exclusion is broadly seen as necessary because many
kinds of agreements have substantial tangible consequences,
whether economic or physical. (c) Restricting such agreements
does little to interfere with self-government or discussion of
issues, whether political, religious, scientific, social, artistic, or
even personal. We can say that the restriction on speech is just
incidental to the restriction on the “conduct” of agreement, but
that obscures more than it reveals, given that the agreement is
itself mutual communication of future intentions.
2. Limitations on the Exception
The conspiracy exception, too, has to be limited by First
Amendment considerations.153 Whitney v. California, for instance, involved a law that essentially banned conspiracies to
“advocate, teach or aid and abet” criminal “means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change.”154 Though the law could be violated
simply by a conspiracy to advocate or teach such behavior, the
152
Mulcahy v. Queen (1868) 3 LRE & I. App. 306 (HL) 317 (appeal taken from
Ir.), quoted in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 299 (1908) (as to unlawful business
conspiracies to restrain trade); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205 (1904) (as
to unlawful union conspiracies to strike); Commonwealth v. Walters, 266 S.W.
1066, 1068 (Ky. 1924) (as to unlawful conspiracies to commit crime); State v.
Carbone, 91 A.2d 571, 574 (N.J. 1952) (joined by William Brennan, J.) (same); 2
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 12.2(a) (2d ed. 2003) (quoting this as
a common-law rule).
153
See generally Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression, 76 ALB. L. REV. 697, 698–700 (2013).
154
274 U.S. 357, 359–60 (1927).
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purpose to advocate or teach would itself be a purpose to bring
the behavior about.
In principle, conspiracies to advocate and teach could thus
often be classified as ordinary conspiracies to bring about the
crime. And the Court defended the law in part based on the
argument that “[t]he essence of the offense denounced by the
Act is the combining with others in an association for the accomplishment of the desired ends through the advocacy and
use of criminal and unlawful methods. It partakes of the nature of a criminal conspiracy.”155
The same was so in Dennis v. United States, where Justice
Jackson’s concurrence expressly relied on Giboney. “The defense of freedom of speech or press,” Justice Jackson reasoned,
has often been raised in conspiracy cases, because, whether
committed by Communists, by businessmen, or by common
criminals, it usually consists of words written or spoken,
evidenced by letters, conversations, speeches or documents.
Communication is the essence of every conspiracy, for only
by it can common purpose and concert of action be brought
about or be proved.156

The Giboney reasoning, Justice Jackson argued, rejected
protection for union conspiracies to commit crimes;157 it likewise rejected such protection for Communist conspiracies.158
Yet the Court has overruled Whitney,159 and limited Dennis
to “advocacy . . . directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action”160 (a vastly narrower range of speech than the speech
alleged in Dennis itself). Agreements to speak, even when the
speech is aimed at eventually producing crime—such as sabotage or revolution—are thus not within today’s conspiracy
exception.

155
Id. at 371–72. Justice Brandeis concurred on the grounds that there was
evidence that the defendant had been involved in a conspiracy to commit “present
serious crimes,” and not just a conspiracy “to advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution by mass action at some date necessarily far in the future.” Id. at
379 (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment). But a mere conspiracy to advocate, in his view, would be constitutionally protected. Id.
156
341 U.S. 494, 575 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment).
157
Id. at 575–56 (quoting Giboney at length).
158
See id.
159
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
160
Id. at 447 & n.2.
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F. Speech That Violates the Law for Reasons Unrelated to
Its Communicative Impact
At times, Giboney has also been cited for the proposition
that a law may be applied to speech for reasons that are independent of what the speech communicates. Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., for instance, suggested that when “an ordinance
against outdoor fires” is applied to “burning a flag,” that application is valid for reasons related to the Giboney rationale.161
And Rumsfeld v. FAIR cited Giboney in holding that a law requiring universities to treat military recruiters on par with
other recruiters could constitutionally be applied to the universities’ sending out announcements about where the recruiters
were going to be.162 The equal treatment provision applied to
equal distribution of speech as well as, for instance, equal provision of space.
Both of these cases involved speech that was affected “incidental[ly],” simply in the sense that it applied to speech without
regard to the supposed harms that flowed from its communicative content.163 That explains how an ordinance against outdoor fires can be applied against flag burning.164 Indeed, the
language of “incidental” restrictions on speech was used in
United States v. O’Brien, the precedent that would normally be
applied to restrictions on outdoor fires.165 And this fits well
with Giboney’s statement that the First Amendment generally
does not protect “speech or writing used as an integral part of
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”166 Indeed,
California v. LaRue seems to treat Giboney and O’Brien as
closely related.167
161
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385
(1992)).
162
547 U.S. 47, 61–62 (2006).
163
See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2655; Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 70.
164
See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Meyer, 786 N.E.2d 521, 529 (Ohio Ct. App.
2003) (upholding a conviction in such a case); Bohmfalk v. City of San Antonio,
No. SA–09–CV–0497 OG (NN), 2010 WL 2303387, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. June 4,
2010) (concluding that an arrest in such a case didn’t violate the First
Amendment).
165
391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
166
336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
167
409 U.S. 109, 117 (1972); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
466–67 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that distribution of contraceptives, though coupled with certain kinds of speech, is outside First Amendment
protection (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376; Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502)); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 615–16 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (arguing that flag
burning, though done with the purpose of protest, is outside First Amendment
protection (citing O’Brien and Giboney)).
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G. Summary: The Other Crime Requirement
We can thus arrive at a general summary of the “speech
integral to [illegal] conduct” doctrine, as it has been understood
by post-Giboney cases:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

When speech may cause other unlawful (criminal or tortious) conduct, or threatens that the speaker will engage
in such illegal conduct,
courts are entitled to develop rules defining some such
speech as restrictable,
much as the Court has done for advocacy of crime (under
the rubric of the incitement and solicitation doctrines),
for fighting words, for threats, and for child pornography,
all of which have at times been viewed as special cases of
the “speech integral to [unlawful] conduct” doctrine.
The word “integral” is thus the Court’s way of suggesting
that the speech is substantially enough connected to
some other crime for the speech to be potentially punishable—though this connection to crime is only a necessary condition for triggering the exception, not a
sufficient one.
The illegal conduct can consist either of physical nonspeech behavior or of agreement, which is treated as
analogous to physical conduct.
It is not enough that the speech itself be labeled illegal
conduct, e.g., “contempt of court,” “breach of the peace,”
“sedition,” or “use of illegally gathered information.”
Rather, it must help cause or threaten other illegal conduct (including an illegal agreement), which may make
restricting the speech a justifiable means of preventing
that other conduct.

The most helpful way of thinking about Giboney, then, is as
a case that discusses when new exceptions to free speech protection may be recognized—even by absolutists (such as Justice Black), or by those who think that only historical
exceptions to free speech protection may be recognized (such
as Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and the other Justices
who signed on to Stevens). Indeed, the continuing treatment of
fighting words, incitement, solicitation, and child pornography
as separate exceptions supports that view.
But some modern cases, such as Stevens, treat Giboney as
creating an overarching exception for “speech integral to [illegal] conduct.”168 That too is plausible, but it is necessary to
recognize that the boundaries of the exception differ sharply
168

See United States v. Stevens, 599 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).
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depending on the way the speech is linked to the conduct.
Giboney cited both Fox v. Washington and Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, after all, to support its conclusion—but the advocacy/solicitation exception that ultimately flowed from Fox has
very different boundaries from the fighting words exception
that flowed from Chaplinsky. The boundaries for the Ferber
speech-that-creates-incentive-for-illegal-conduct doctrine (the
most recent direct application of Giboney) are different still.
I would have favored a different approach to dealing with
such matters, but the summary I offer above is what the cases
dictate. That the doctrine applies to speech integral to tortious
conduct flows directly from Rumsfeld v. FAIR, which gave as an
example speech that threatens civilly actionable (but not criminal) discrimination, and Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB,
which likewise involved a threat of civilly actionable retaliation.169 That the tendency of speech to cause or threaten illegal
conduct may indeed strip it of protection stems not just from
Giboney but also from Chaplinsky, Ferber, FAIR, and the other
cases I cited.
Moreover, though some subdoctrines within the “speech
integral to [illegal] conduct” exception require that the speech
be close in time or space to the conduct—consider incitement
and fighting words—others do not. For instance, the distribution of child pornography can be punished even if it happens
many years after the criminal creation of the material, and even
if the tendency of the distribution to cause future criminal
creation (by creating a market for the created material) likewise
operates over time and across space.170 Similarly, solicitation
can be a crime even if it solicits a crime at some time in the
future (e.g., solicits the commission of a carefully planned murder rather than a spontaneous one).171
That such a causal connection is not sufficient to justify
restricting speech, and is only the first step in developing the
boundaries of any new exception (or subexception), stems from
Brandenburg, Bartnicki, Gooding v. Wilson,172 and the various
169
See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006); Va. Elec. & Power Co. v.
NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 533–34, 546 (1943).
170
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (2012) (criminalizing the distribution of child
pornography); id. § 2252(a)(3) (criminalizing the distribution alone of child pornography, as opposed to requiring creation and distribution for prosecution); New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 n.10 (1982) (noting the long-lasting negative
effects of child pornography as a rationale for the prescribed punishment).
171
See, e.g., Westbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
172
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529–34 (2001); Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1972); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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other cases discussed above. And the inapplicability of the
doctrine to cases where speech itself violates a ban on conduct
(because of its communicative conduct), as opposed to tending
to cause or threaten other conduct, stems from Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, Cohen v. California, Terminiello v. City
of Chicago, Bridges v. California, Cantwell v. Connecticut, and
the other cases discussed below in Part II.A.
H. Summary: The Function of the “Speech Integral to
[Illegal] Conduct” Doctrine
We have seen, then, what the “speech integral to criminal
conduct” doctrine has meant in First Amendment law; Part II
will discuss what it hasn’t meant, or has stopped meaning. But
let me offer here some thoughts about one function this doctrine has had, and some speculation about why we have seen a
return to this doctrine since 2006.
Giboney, as I’ve noted above, was an opinion by Justice
Black, who long described himself as a First Amendment absolutist.173 Justice Douglas sometimes likewise argued that the
First Amendment was an absolute, especially starting after
Dennis v. United States.174
Yet even Justices Black and Douglas weren’t willing to offer
constitutional protection to all speech. As noted above, they
had no objection to bans on “fighting words,”175 threats of illegal conduct,176 or solicitation of illegal conduct.177 Presumably, they would have said the same as to classic aiding and
abetting, in which one criminal advises on the details of how to
commit a crime.178 Justice Douglas expressed regret about his
agreeing in Valentine v. Chrestensen179 that commercial adver173
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting,
joined by Black, J.); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 554 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 211 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
174
See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 275 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas,
J.); Roth, 354 U.S. at 514 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
175
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
176
NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 478–80 (1941).
177
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 491 (1949).
178
See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (taking the view that the First Amendment wouldn’t protect “teaching
the techniques of sabotage, the assassination of the President, the filching of
documents from public files, the planting of bombs, the art of street warfare, and
the like” as a means of helping people commit those crimes).
179
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
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tising was categorically unprotected,180 but never about his
agreeing in Chaplinsky that fighting words were unprotected.
Justices Black and Douglas fought the libel, obscenity, and
incitement exceptions,181 but not the other exceptions I
mentioned.
The doctrine that “speech integral to criminal conduct”—
or, as Justice Douglas liked to put it, “[speech] brigaded with
illegal action”182—is constitutionally unprotected thus had an
important function in Justice Black’s and Justice Douglas’s
jurisprudence: it provided room for restrictions on speech even
within a purportedly “absolutist” framework. Indeed, in Konigsberg v. State Bar, Justice Black expressly used Giboney
and its predecessor, NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,183
this way:
The Court suggests that a “literal reading of the First Amendment” would be totally unreasonable because it would invalidate many widely accepted laws. I do not know to what
extent this is true. I do not believe, for example, that it would
invalidate laws resting upon the premise that where speech is
an integral part of unlawful conduct that is going on at the
time, the speech can be used to illustrate, emphasize and
establish the unlawful conduct. [Footnote: Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (dissenting opinion). See also Labor Board v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469;
Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490.]184

And there is a principled vision of the First Amendment
and of democracy that one can draw from Justice Black’s position, whether one agrees with it or not:185 what one might call
the “rule of law” model of free speech.
In that vision, a democratic legal system has broad authority to prohibit physical and economic conduct: murder, public
nudity, retaliatory dismissal of employees who vote for a union,
refusal to deal with nonunion customers, and the like. The
Free Speech Clause denies the legal system the general authority to restrict speech, even through democratically chosen laws.
In a democratic rule of law system, you can advocate for
180
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Rels., 413 U.S. 376,
398 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498,
513–14 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
181
See supra notes 95–97.
182
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (“Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with
illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it.”).
183
See supra Part I.D.
184
366 U.S. 36, 64 & n.18 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
185
I myself am open to some applications of it but skeptical about others.

R
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whatever law you want, and you can use speech to create social
and economic pressure. But the legal system may prohibit you
from causing illegal conduct, even causing it through speech,
or using your capacity for illegal conduct to coerce others.
Law-abiding citizens ought not use violence or other illegal
nonspeech conduct, whether directly or indirectly, to bring
about the changes they seek.
Justice Black never articulated this position directly. But
his acceptance of speech restrictions in the solicitation,
threats, and fighting words cases, and rejection of speech restrictions in most other cases, seems best explicable by this
sort of “rule of law” approach.
Since United States v. Stevens, the Court has taken the
view—whether rightly or wrongly—that the list of First Amendment exceptions is essentially limited to historically recognized
exceptions, such as the ones for obscenity, libel, and the
like.186 It has thus found itself facing much the same question
that Justices Black and Douglas were facing: How to make
room for other speech restrictions that also jeopardize the rule
of law (by tending to cause illegal conduct), when those restrictions—for instance, the child pornography restriction—do not
have a solid historical provenance? The Giboney umbrella
seems to be the Court’s answer to that question.
II
HOW THE “SPEECH INTEGRAL TO [ILLEGAL] CONDUCT”
EXCEPTION OUGHT NOT BE DEFINED: THE
SUPREME COURT CASES
Part I tried to summarize what the holding and applications of Giboney can mean, consistently both with the precedents that cite it and with other First Amendment precedents.
The language of Giboney itself can indeed be read more
broadly, as authorizing considerably more speech restrictions.
But such broad interpretations of Giboney are not consistent
with First Amendment precedents, either those decided since
Giboney or those decided before and at the same time.
A. Upholding Laws That Can Be Violated Through the
Communicative Impact of Speech, as Well as
Through Conduct?
One of the most-quoted passages in Giboney is, “[i]t rarely
has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech
186

559 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2010).
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and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”187 And there is a possible broad reading of this passage:
(a) when a valid criminal statute bans any conduct (speech
or not)
(b) that causes (or intends to cause or is likely to cause) a
particular harm,
(c) speech that likewise causes that same harm and therefore
triggers the statute may be punished,
(d) even when the harm flows from what the speech
communicates.

Thus, if there is a “valid criminal statute” banning any
conduct that causes restraint of trade, speech that violates this
statute would be punishable, too. There would be no need to
conclude that the speech constitutes punishable solicitation of
some other crime (or threat, conspiracy, or aiding and abetting). So long as the speech fits the elements of this facially
speech-neutral crime, the speech is not constitutionally
immunized.
This doctrine, though, was rejected by the Court in Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project.188 It has been implicitly rejected
in other post-Giboney cases. And it is inconsistent with two
leading precedents decided shortly before Giboney.
1. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: Speech That
Helps Terrorists
Holder dealt with a statute banning “material support” to
foreign terrorist organizations, conduct “which most often does
not take the form of speech at all”189 and which was defined
based on the tendency of the conduct to aid harm-causing
agents. The law could apply to speech, such as “training on the
use of international law or advice on petitioning the United
Nations,” but also to the provision of money, goods, or
soldiers.190 The government argued that, as a result, the law
was just a speech-neutral conduct restriction that only incidentally burdened speech—even when the speech triggered the
law precisely because its content (such as training or advice)
provided material support.191
187
188
189
190
191

336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
561 U.S. 1 (2010).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27–28.
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Not so, the Court concluded, citing Cohen v. California (as
the “most prominent[ ]” of “a number of our precedents”192).
Both Holder and Cohen, the Court pointed out, “involved a
generally applicable regulation of conduct” (in Cohen, this was
breach of the peace).193 “But when Cohen was convicted for
wearing a jacket bearing an epithet, we did not apply O’Brien,”
the test applicable to conduct restrictions that incidentally
burden speech.194
“Instead, we recognized that the generally applicable law
was directed at Cohen because of what his speech communicated—he violated the breach of the peace statute because of
the offensive content of his particular message. We accordingly
applied more rigorous scrutiny and reversed his conviction.”195
Likewise, the Court held, strict scrutiny should be applied to
the material support ban in those situations where the speech
constitutes material support “because of what [the] speech
communicated.”196
This makes sense: it’s the only way to explain Cohen and
the other similar cases discussed below. And it shows that the
denial of protection “to speech or writing used as an integral
part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute” can’t
mean that a facially valid speech-neutral conduct restriction
could be freely applied to speech based on what the speech
says.197
The Holder Court did mention Giboney in passing. The
government had briefly argued that plaintiffs were unprotected
because their speech “coordinated with foreign terrorist organizations” was similar to “speech effecting a crime, like the words
that constitute a conspiracy.”198 The Court cited Giboney as a
“See, e.g.,” following this statement, but then declined to “consider any such argument because the Government does not
develop it.”199 The Court thus had no occasion to determine
whether the Giboney-based conspiracy exception (see Part I.E)
could justify the material support ban. But it was pretty clear
that the Court, despite being aware of Giboney, was rejecting
192

Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
194
Id.
195
Id. (emphasis added).
196
Id.
197
Holder of course did uphold the speech restriction, but only after evaluating it as a content-based speech restriction and upholding it under strict scrutiny,
based on (1) the restriction’s narrowness and (2) its being justified by a compelling
government interest in preventing terrorism. Id. at 25–26, 28, 39.
198
Id. at 27 n.5.
199
Id.
193
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the view that speech can be punished whenever it violates a
generally applicable conduct restriction.
2. Giboney-era and Post-Giboney Cases: Breach of the
Peace
Indeed, before and immediately around Giboney, the Court
had dealt with general conduct restrictions that were triggered
by what speech communicated. In such situations, the Court
treated the laws as speech restrictions and struck them down
when the speech didn’t fit within a historically recognized exception to protection.
One notable example was breach of the peace. In Cantwell
v. Connecticut, the Court acknowledged the general constitutionality of breach-of-the-peace law, which has historically applied to a wide range of constitutionally unprotected
conduct.200 But when the law was applied to offensive speech
because of “the effect of [the speaker’s] communication upon
his hearers,”201 it violated the First Amendment.
Terminiello v. City of Chicago202—argued two months
before Giboney was decided and decided a month after
Giboney—is another example. Like Cantwell, Terminiello used
the First Amendment to set aside a conviction under a breachof-the-peace ordinance. The breach of the peace in that case
stemmed from Terminiello’s giving a racist speech that angered
a crowd gathered outside the meeting hall in which Terminiello
was speaking.
Terminiello held that the ordinance wasn’t generally valid,
but only because, as applied to speech, the ordinance reached
beyond “fighting words.” Barring all conduct that tends to
cause a breach of the peace, including speech that has the
same effect, thus violates the First Amendment. The very fact
that the ordinance did not provide “immunity to speech or writing”—at least outside the Chaplinsky exception—made it into
something other than “a valid criminal statute.”
In the decades that followed, the Court repeatedly held
generally applicable breach-of-the-peace laws invalid when
they were applied to speech based on “the effect of [the
speaker’s] communication on his hearers.” This happened in
200
See 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). In that instance, the law was a statute, not a
common law rule, but shortly after Giboney the Court made clear that the Giboney
principle applies to common law rules as well as statutes. Hughes v. Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
201
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309.
202
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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Edwards v. South Carolina,203 in Hess v. Indiana,204 and most
famously in Cohen.205 (The latter two cases both involved asapplied challenges to valid laws.)
3. Giboney-era and Post-Giboney Cases: Contempt of
Court
Like breach-of-the-peace law, contempt-of-court law prohibits a wide range of conduct, speech or otherwise. In the
1940s, that conduct was defined as anything that “ha[s] a ‘reasonable tendency’ to interfere with the orderly administration
of justice in pending actions before judicial tribunals.”206 But
by the time Giboney was decided, the Court had already held
that facially valid contempt-of-court rules might be unconstitutional as applied to out-of-court speech criticizing a judge’s
decision.
The first such case—written by Justice Black, the author of
Giboney—was Bridges v. California, which set aside a conviction for common-law contempt of court.207 Giboney cited
Bridges favorably as an example of “the essential importance to
our society of a vigilant protection of freedom of speech and
press.”208 Two more pre-Giboney cases, Craig v. Harney209 and
Pennekamp v. Florida,210 likewise used the First Amendment to
set aside convictions for statutory contempt of court. The pattern continued after Giboney, in Wood v. Georgia.211
4. Post-Giboney Cases: Antitrust Law and Interference
with Business Relations
Indeed, since Giboney, the Court has made clear that even
antitrust law—the very sort of law involved in Giboney—is limited by the First Amendment. Antitrust law, as Giboney noted,
is generally applicable and is generally used to punish conduct,
not speech. But when organizations help restrain trade by
lobbying legislatures and the public for anticompetitive regulations, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
203

372 U.S. 229, 234–37 (1963).
414 U.S. 105, 105 n.1, 107–09 (1973).
205
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
206
Bridges v. Superior Court, 94 P.2d 983, 995–96 (Cal. 1939), rev’d sub nom.
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
207
314 U.S. at 258, 278.
208
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 501 (1949).
209
331 U.S. 367, 368, 378 (1947).
210
328 U.S. 331, 333, 349–50 (1946).
211
370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962).
204
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Freight, Inc. (1962)212 and United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington (1965)213 make clear that the speech may not be
punished.
Noerr and Pennington reached these speech-protective results by interpreting the Sherman Act as not applying to anticompetitive lobbying or public advocacy. But the Court was
clearly influenced by a desire to avoid a First Amendment violation. In the words of Noerr, failing to read a public advocacy
exception into the Sherman Act “would raise important constitutional questions.”214
The same is true of the related tort of interference with
business relations. That too is a facially valid tort, which covers a wide range of conduct and constitutionally unprotected
speech (such as threats or defamation). But in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, the Court held that the First Amendment
barred applying the tort to speech that interfered with business
relations by urging a political boycott.215
5. Post-Giboney Cases: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is likewise a
facially valid tort, which permissibly covers conduct and constitutionally unprotected speech. Yet Hustler v. Falwell216 and
Snyder v. Phelps217 set aside intentional infliction of emotional
distress verdicts when those verdicts were based on constitutionally protected speech that caused distress because of its
message.
The Court has left open the possibility that speech that is
not “of public concern” and that outrageously inflicts severe
emotional distress may be actionable.218 But this was not
212

365 U.S. 127, 144–45 (1961).
381 U.S. 657, 659–61 (1965).
214
365 U.S. at 137–38; see also FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n,
493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) (noting the Noerr Court’s interpretation of the Sherman
Act “in the light of the First Amendment[ ]”); David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley,
Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 363–66 (1994) (arguing that Noerr-Pennington immunity makes sense only as a First Amendment exception to antitrust
law, and not as a faithful interpretation of antitrust law standing alone). These
cases involved civil lawsuits, but surely speech should be at least as protected
against criminal punishments as it is against civil suits.
215
458 U.S. 886, 912–13 (1982).
216
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
217
562 U.S. 443 (2011).
218
Id. at 451–52.
213
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based on any general conclusion that a facially speech-neutral
tort could be freely applied to speech as well as conduct.
B. Upholding Restrictions on Speech That “Subvert[s]”
Government Policies?
There is another way of reading Giboney—as allowing the
government to restrict speech that produces socially harmful
behavior, whether that behavior is itself criminal or otherwise.
The Court experimented with this reading in the 1950s, but
ultimately retreated from such an approach (at least outside
picketing, which the cases have long treated as special).
A year after Giboney, the Court decided Hughes v. Superior
Court.219 Picketers had been trying to pressure a grocery store
chain to “hire Negro clerks in proportion to Negro customers,”220 and the California Supreme Court upheld an injunction against such picketing.221 Justice Black, joined by Justice
Minton, concluded the injunction was constitutional on the
basis of Giboney, with no further elaboration.222 The majority
opinion, which Justice Black didn’t join, also cited Giboney,
but for a broader proposition:
Picketing is not beyond the control of a State if the manner in which picketing is conducted or the purpose which it
seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance. See . . .
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. . . . .
The constitutional boundary line between the competing
interests of society involved in the use of picketing cannot be
established by general phrases . . . . The California Supreme
Court suggested a distinction between picketing to promote
discrimination, as here, and picketing against discrimination: “It may be assumed for the purposes of this decision,
without deciding, that if such discrimination exists, picketing
to protest it would not be for an unlawful objective.” We
cannot construe the Due Process Clause as precluding California from securing respect for its policy against involuntary
employment on racial lines by prohibiting systematic picketing that would subvert such policy. See Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., supra.223

But neither the Court nor Justice Black discussed a major
difference between Giboney and Hughes—in Giboney, the action that the picketers sought (Empire Ice’s refusal to deal with
219
220
221
222
223

Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 469 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 465–66 (citations omitted in part).
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nonunion peddlers) was illegal under state law, but in Hughes,
racially discriminatory hiring was not illegal. California
wouldn’t outlaw race discrimination in employment until
1959,224 and the California Supreme Court decision didn’t purport to outlaw such discrimination either.225 The U.S. Supreme Court was therefore taking the view that picketing could
be banned even if it sought to pressure employers into acting
legally, albeit (in the California Supreme Court’s view) socially
undesirably (because of the “policy against involuntary employment on racial lines”).226
Likewise, in Electrical Workers v. NLRB (1951), the Court
upheld a ban on “secondary boycotts,” in which a union that
had a dispute with an employer picketed a neutral party, which
was doing business with the employer, trying to pressure the
neutral into pressuring the employer to comply with the
union’s demands.227 Again, the conduct that the union was
soliciting—the neutral’s pressure on the employer—was not
illegal, unlike the solicited conduct in Giboney, which was
illegal.
Nonetheless, the Court relied on Giboney, listing it as one
of several precedents that had “recognized the constitutional
right of states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives.”228 Suggesting that Electrical Workers
involved an “unlawful objective[ ]” implied that using speech to
pressure a neutral party to pressure the employer could be

224
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1412 (1959) (repealed 1980) (current version at CAL. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 12921 (West 2014)).
225
Justice Reed concurred in Hughes, having “read the opinion of the Supreme Court of California to hold that the pickets sought from Lucky Stores, Inc.,
discrimination in favor of persons of the Negro race, a discrimination unlawful
under California law.” 339 U.S. at 469 (Reed, J., concurring). But no other Justices endorsed this view, and the California Supreme Court decision doesn’t support it. Justice Traynor’s dissenting opinion below specifically pointed out that
employers remained free to discriminate based on race. See Hughes v. Superior
Court, 198 P.2d 885, 896 (Cal. 1948) (Traynor, J., dissenting, joined by Carter,
J.); see also Jones v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 308 P.2d 393, 395 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1957) (stating, several years after Hughes, that there was no recognized
“right to private employment without discrimination on the basis of race”). The
California Supreme Court held only that picketing to pressure employers into
discriminating was unlawful, not that employer discrimination was itself unlawful. See Osmond K. Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing—Constitutionally Protected?, 99
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1950) (recognizing this); Elliot L. Richardson, Freedom of
Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 n.86 (1951) (same).
226
Hughes, 339 U.S. at 466.
227
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 700–01 (1951).
228
Id. at 705.
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made unlawful—even though the solicited neutral party action
would have itself been legal.229
If this principle were taken to its logical conclusion, it
would essentially justify any restrictions on speech that urges
behavior that legislatures or courts have declared harmful—or
at least on speech that uses the threat of economic pressure to
produce such behavior.230 This fits well with the general vision
of Justice Frankfurter, who wrote Hughes and Teamsters, Inc.
v. Vogt (1957),231 a case that reaffirmed the secondary boycott
principle of Electrical Workers (and that drew a sharp dissent
from Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black and Chief Justice Warren).232
But, like some other speech-restrictive doctrines from the
1950s that Justice Frankfurter promoted,233 these interpretations of Giboney have not had much generative force. Indeed,
in California v. LaRue and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
the Court recharacterized Hughes as involving “a boycott designed to secure aims that are themselves prohibited by a valid
state law”234—as noted above, not a factually correct description of Hughes, but one that the Court imposed to cabin the
force of Hughes.
Likewise, while restrictions on picketing to support secondary boycotts have been reaffirmed as recently as NLRB v. Re229

Id.
See, e.g., Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1324 n.15 (8th
Cir. 1980) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (citing Giboney and arguing that advocacy of a
boycott of Missouri businesses, aimed at getting Missouri to ratify Equal Rights
Amendment, might be constitutionally punishable as an antitrust law violation);
Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah 1982) (citing Giboney and holding
that the state Humane Society’s advocacy of a tourist boycott of a county, aimed
at getting the county to improve its dog pound, could be constitutionally punishable as interference with a prospective business advantage). NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), discussed below, makes these positions
untenable.
231
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
232
Id. at 295–97 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
233
See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding a law
prohibiting group libel); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 552 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (concurring regarding the constitutionality
of a law prohibiting conspiracy to advocate violent government overthrow); Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 268, 287–89 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
result) (concurring regarding the constitutionality of arresting a political speaker
because his speech seems likely to lead to a violent retaliation by offended
listeners).
234
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 915 n.49; California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.
109, 117–18 (1972) (characterizing the speech in Hughes as “expression that is
directed to the accomplishment of an end that the State has declared to be
illegal”).
230
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tail Store Employees,235 two of the six Justices in the majority
concurred in the judgment on narrow grounds, suggesting that
similar restrictions outside the specific factual context of picketing and secondary boycotts might be unconstitutional.236
And in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building
& Construction Trades Council, the Court strongly suggested
that all these cases are limited to picketing and do not cover
other speech, such as leafleting.237
Indeed, the Court’s cases from before Giboney repeatedly
stressed that there was something special about picketing,
alone among media of communication, that justified extra
speech restrictions. Giboney itself stated—quoting a 1942 concurrence by Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and
Murphy—that
[p]icketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the
very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind
or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which
are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing
make it the subject of restrictive regulation.238

Hughes quoted the same passage.239 And later non-picketing
cases, such as DeBartolo and Babbitt v. Farm Workers, similarly stressed that picketing is less constitutionally protected
because it “is qualitatively ‘different from other modes of
communication.’”240
Indeed, Giboney seems to have been further limited to labor
picketing, when NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. distinguished the “economic regulation” involved in Giboney from
235

447 U.S. 607 (1980).
Id. at 617–18 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 618–19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
237
485 U.S. 568, 580 (1988).
238
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 n.6 (1949) (quoting
Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776–77 (1942)).
239
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464–65 (1950).
240
DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 580 (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l
Union, 442 U.S. 289, 311 n.17 (1979), which in turn quoted Hughes, 339 U.S. at
465); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 455 (1969) (noting that picketing is
“free speech plus” that can be permissibly subjected to greater regulation than
typical speech); Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 333 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (same); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S.
611, 617 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, 563 (1965) (same); id. at
578 (Black, J., concurring in one case and dissenting in another) (same); NLRB v.
Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58, 77 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) (same).
236
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“peaceful political activity” involved in Claiborne itself.241 The
broad reading of Giboney—as authorizing restrictions on any
speech that “subvert[s]” important government policies (even
when the speech doesn’t seek to promote illegal conduct)242—
has thus not survived outside the limited zone of labor picketing, and possibly just labor picketing to promote secondary
boycotts.243
C. Upholding Restrictions on Speech That Involves
Economic Coercion Through Threats of Lawful
Retaliation?
Giboney could also have been understood as allowing regulation of speech that threatened social or economic retaliation,
even when that retaliation would itself be lawful.
One of the footnotes seemed to point in that direction. It
quoted Thomas v. Collins for the proposition that “[w]hen to . . .
persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion,
or give it that character, the limit of the right has been
passed.”244 And it quoted Justice Jackson’s Thomas concurrence for the proposition that once an employer or employee
“uses the economic power which he has over other men and
241
I’m not persuaded by this distinction. Labor picketing has famously long
had a political dimension. Conversely, the politically boycott in Claiborne Hardware both used economic pressure as a tool and sought to accomplish economic
goals—indeed, labor-related goals—such as the hiring of black employees by
white-owned businesses. Nonetheless, this is the distinction the Court offered.
242
Hughes, 339 U.S. at 466.
243
Likewise, though California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 515–16 (1972), could be read as authorizing restrictions on First
Amendment activity that undermines important public goals, later cases have
rejected this reading. California Motor Transport suggested that some litigation
campaigns—which would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause—could sometimes be punished as antitrust violations, if they had
anticompetitive purposes and effects. Id. at 513. And the Court cited Giboney for
that proposition, saying that “[i]t is well settled that First Amendment rights are
not immunized from regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct
which violates a valid statute.” Id. at 514.
But BE&K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002), and Professional
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49
(1993), made clear that antitrust laws can be applied in this context only when the
anticompetitive litigation was undertaken without “probable cause” as well as
with an anticompetitive purpose. BE&K Constr., 536 U.S. at 526; Prof’l Real
Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 62. And litigation that lacks “probable cause” has long
been recognized as outside the scope of the Petition Clause altogether, quite apart
from Giboney or any similar doctrine. See, e.g., Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983). This, for instance, is why the tort of wrongful
civil proceedings (also sometimes labeled “malicious prosecution”) is constitutional. See id. at 744, 747 n.14.
244
Giboney, 336 U.S. at 503 n.6 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
537–38 (1945)).
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their jobs to influence their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment.”245
But this too has generally been rejected by more recent
Supreme Court opinions, at least when the speech doesn’t involve picketing (as opposed to leafletting) and doesn’t involve
labor speech. Claiborne Hardware, as noted above, held that
speech promoting a boycott of white-owned businesses was
constitutionally protected—even though the speech helped exert economic pressure on businesses and social pressure
(likely including economic pressure) on blacks who might have
preferred not to go along with the boycott. “Speech does not
lose its protected character,” the Court wrote, “simply because
it may embarrass others or coerce them into action.”246
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe likewise held that
speech aimed at using economic pressure was fully protected.247 Keefe, a real estate agent, sought to enjoin the Organization for a Better Austin from leafletting against him
(leafletting aimed at getting him to change his business practices). Keefe’s argument cited Giboney, arguing that the “purpose [of the leafletting] was admittedly to pressure Keefe” into
going along with the Organization’s demands.248 But the Court
disagreed, reasoning that “[t]he claim that the expressions were
intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not
remove them from the reach of the First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent’s conduct by their
activities; this is not fundamentally different from the function
of a newspaper.”249

245

Id. (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 543–44 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).
247
402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
248
Brief for Respondent at 20, Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971) (No. 135).
249
Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493
U.S. 411, 428 n.12 (1990), cited Giboney for the proposition that “[a] nonviolent
and totally voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on local economic
conditions. This Court has recognized the strong governmental interest in certain
forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association.” But Superior Court Trial Lawyers
was a case about regulation of outright conspiracies in restraint of trade, which
the Court has long seen as constitutionally permissible. See supra Part I.E. It
was not a case about speech advocating or even facilitating such conspiracies.
246
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D. Upholding Conduct Restrictions That “Incidental[ly]
Burden[ ]” Speech?
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., a Vermont statute restricted
pharmacies from selling information about which doctors prescribed which drugs. Drug companies wanted to use such information (which identified the prescribing doctors but not the
patients) to more effectively market to doctors, but Vermont
sought to prevent such marketing.250 The Court struck down
this restriction, in an opinion chiefly remembered for its commercial speech analysis.251
But the Court also touched on Giboney, in responding to
the state’s argument that the law was “a mere commercial regulation” and thus not subjected to any “heightened . . . scrutiny” at all:
It is . . . true that the First Amendment does not prevent
restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing
incidental burdens on speech. That is why a ban on racebased hiring may require employers to remove “ ‘White Applicants Only’ ” signs, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, Inc.; why “an ordinance
against outdoor fires” might forbid “burning a flag,” R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul; and why antitrust laws can prohibit “agreements in restraint of trade,” Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co.
But § 4631(d) imposes more than an incidental burden
on protected expression. Both on its face and in its practical
operation, Vermont’s law imposes a burden based on the
content of speech and the identity of the speaker. . . . Vermont’s law does not simply have an effect on speech, but is
directed at certain content and is aimed at particular
speakers.252

There are several things going on here, and it’s helpful to
tease them apart. In one of the examples the Court gives, the
fire ordinance is used to forbid flag burning for reasons unrelated to “the content of speech” (in this instance, the communicative impact of the symbolic act of flag burning).253 In
another, the “agreements in restraint of trade” example, the
agreements have historically been viewed as a form of conduct
(see Part I.E.), even though it takes communication to create an
agreement.254
250
251
252
253
254

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
See id. at 2664, 2672.
Id. at 2664–65 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
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But in the “White Applicants Only” example, the harm is
indeed connected to the content of speech: as Part I.D noted,
“White Applicants Only” is forbidden by the law precisely because it conveys a message that threatens illegal discrimination. That message is properly prohibitable, but it is not,
strictly speaking, an “incidental” burden on speech in the
sense of a burden unrelated to the communicative content of
the speech (Compare Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
which noted that the O’Brien test for restrictions that “incidentally burden[ ] . . . expression” was inapplicable when a “generally applicable law [is] directed at [a speaker] because of what
his speech communicated.”255).
The better way to make sense of Sorrell, I think, is to note
what the three items have in common: they all involve laws that
are applied to behavior that is itself conduct—for instance, the
physical burning of an object without regard to what the burning communicates, or an agreement that is viewed as a form of
conduct256—or is treated as closely linked to such conduct,
because it consists of speech that causes or threatens such
conduct in a constitutionally unprotected way.
III
THE “SPEECH INTEGRAL TO [ILLEGAL] CONDUCT”
EXCEPTION IN LOWER COURTS
Unsurprisingly, the “speech integral to [illegal] conduct”
exception has been taken up by lower courts, following the
Supreme Court’s lead. Let’s look closely at how this has been
happening, sometimes soundly and sometimes not.
A. (Potentially) Sound Uses of Giboney: Speech Soliciting
or Aiding Other Crimes
1. Solicitation
Many lower court decisions, both before United States v.
Williams257 and after, have cited Giboney in cases factually
much like Giboney itself: cases where the speaker is soliciting
the commission of some other crime.258 Thus, for instance, a
recent Minnesota decision upheld a ban on soliciting prostitu255

See 561 U.S. 1, 26, 28 (2010); supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part I.E.
257
553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008).
258
See, e.g., United States v. Clum, 607 F. App’x 922, 928 (11th Cir. 2015);
State v. Pegouskie, 113 P.3d 811, 820 (Haw. 2005); State v. Whitmore, 58 So. 3d
583 (La. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Washington-Davis, 867 N.W.2d 222, 232 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2015); State v. Tarbay, 810 N.E.2d 979, 983 & n.19 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009);
256
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tion, citing Giboney for the proposition that “the speech proscribed by the statute is outside the ambit of the First
Amendment’s protection because it is speech integral to criminal conduct.”259
After Williams, it would probably have made more sense to
cite Williams directly, since that case specifically discusses the
solicitation exception. Nonetheless, as Part I.A notes, Giboney
does fit these facts well.
2. Attempts to Commit Crime or Preparation for
Committing Crime
a. Lack of Constitutional Protection for Some Such
Speech
Even when a crime consists of something other than
speech, the criminal may often use speech in the commission
of the crime. Indeed, the attempt to commit the crime may
consist entirely of speech.
Say, for instance, that Don wants to murder Vic (who isn’t
expecting this). To do that, Don e-mails Vic and invites him to
meet at a particular place.
In many jurisdictions, that would constitute the crime of
attempted murder, even if Don does nothing beyond sending
the e-mail (for instance, if he is caught before he has a chance
to physically attack Vic). The Model Penal Code, for instance,
defines attempt to include “purposely do[ing] . . . anything that
. . . constitut[es] a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.”260 And
one classic example of a “substantial step” is “seeking to entice
the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission.”261 Many states adopt this
approach.262
Don’s attempt to commit murder would thus consist solely
of speech said with a bad purpose (the plan to eventually physically attack Vic). The speech doesn’t easily fit within any of the
familiar First Amendment exceptions: it’s not incitement of
State v. March, No. M2007–00701–CCA–R3–CD, 2010 WL 2219419, at *19 (Tenn.
Ct. Crim. App. June 2, 2010).
259
Washington-Davis, 867 N.W.2d at 232.
260
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
261
Id. § 5.01(2)(b).
262
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-49 (West 2015); 18 PA. STAT & CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 901 (West 2015); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 11.4 n.67 (2d ed. 2003) (citing twenty-three states as following this test).
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crime,263 solicitation of crime, a threat, or a harmful and knowingly false statement of fact. Yet the speech is clearly criminally punishable.264
Giboney covers this, in its statement that “it has never
been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed.”265 Here, the
course of conduct is the attempt to commit a nonspeech act
(the planned physical attack on Vic). The course of conduct is
carried out by means of speech.
Unsurprisingly, courts have cited Giboney in upholding
prosecutions for attempt via speech in similar scenarios—for
instance, when a person attempted to entice a child into sexual
activity.266 Likewise, some other inchoate crimes consisting of
speech or conduct intended to promote some further physical
crime may in essence be forms of constitutionally unprotected
attempt, though defined more specifically than in a general
attempt statute.267 Thus, for instance, some courts have cited
Giboney in upholding statutes specifically criminalizing luring
a child to some place with the intent to commit an illegal sexual
act.268
But this zone of unprotected speech is limited to speech
that is preparatory to the actor’s (or the actor’s confederates’)
commission of some other nonspeech act. For instance, a restriction on speech that angers listeners or creates a disturbance could not be upheld on the grounds that the speech
brings about a criminally prohibited result (anger or disturbance). Indeed, that was the very restriction that the Court
263
While it helps bring about a crime, it doesn’t advocate it, and might contemplate a meeting that’s not imminent (e.g., is at a fixed time two weeks in the
future).
264
Cf. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904) (Holmes, J., writing for
the Court) (“The most innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions
may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot neither its
innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punishment of the plot
by law.”), cited in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 500 n.4
(1949).
265
Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502.
266
United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 2007).
267
See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/10-5.1 (West 2015).
268
See, e.g., People v. Williams, 551 N.E.2d 631, 634 (Ill. 1990); State v.
Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431, 440 (N.D. 2003); State v. Robins, 646 N.W.2d 287,
319 (Wis. 2002); see also People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 130 (N.Y. 2000) (upholding a conviction for sending sexually themed material to a minor in a way that
“importunes, invites or induces” the minor to engage in illegal sexual conduct
(quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22(2) (McKinney 2015))).
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held unconstitutional in Terminiello v. City of Chicago,269 which
the Court was considering at the same time as Giboney. (Part
II.A will discuss this in more detail.)
b. Limits on the Exception
Even when it comes to attempts to commit crime, and
other preparations for crime, some speech remains constitutionally protected. Indeed, Schenck v. United States, Frohwerk
v. United States, and Debs v. United States were in large measure attempt prosecutions: the defendants, the government argued, intended to bring about nonspeech conduct
(noncompliance with the draft), and their speech was just a
means of trying to bring about that conduct.270
Today, these cases would almost certainly come out the
other way.271 Under Brandenburg v. Ohio, such speech is protected even if it is intended to and likely to bring about illegal
conduct, because the result that the speaker was attempting to
bring about wasn’t imminent.272 Thus, attempting to bring
about violation of the law by persuading listeners that the law
is wrong is generally constitutionally protected, as Part I.A.2
discussed.
There may well be other First Amendment limits on attempt liability as well. The Court just hasn’t seriously considered the exact boundaries of this exception (or of this
application of the Giboney exception, if that is the right way of
looking at Giboney).
But the important point is that courts need to consider
where these limits are drawn. Simply labeling speech as “attempt” and thus as “integral to [illegal] conduct” doesn’t resolve
the matter.

269

337 U.S. 1, 2–3, 6 (1949).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–49 (1919); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212,
216–17 (1919).
271
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1048–51 (5th ed. 2015); Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 569 (2000); Michael Vitiello, The
Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J.
1175, 1218–19 (2000).
272
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
270
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3. Aiding and Abetting/Crime-Facilitating Speech
a. Lack of Constitutional Protection for Some Such
Speech
Some speech, which I’ve labeled “crime-facilitating
speech,”273 can give people information that helps them commit crimes or escape being caught. A speaker might advise a
criminal friend about how best to disable an alarm system,
grow drugs, or safely make or use a bomb. A speaker might tell
a criminal about a witness to the crime whom the criminal will
then kill or intimidate. A speaker might alert a criminal when
the police are coming (even when there was no conspiratorial
prearrangement to that effect).
As a criminal law matter, this speech would often be labeled “aiding and abetting.” In some jurisdictions, it would
have to be said with the purpose of helping the listener commit
a crime; in others, the speech might be punishable aiding and
abetting even it were just said knowing that it would help the
listener commit the crime.274
And as a First Amendment matter, the speech is likely not
constitutionally protected, precisely because it is so closely
connected to criminal conduct.275 Indeed, the case for punishing such speech is similar to the case for punishing criminal
solicitation. Solicitation may help cause crime by encouraging
people to commit it. Aiding and abetting may help cause crime
by informing them how to commit it (or how to avoid being
caught)—and may in turn encourage people to commit it as
well.
My preference would be for courts to recognize aiding and
abetting as a particular First Amendment exception (alongside
the incitement and solicitation exceptions), rather than relying
on Giboney. But given the Court’s recent acceptance of
Giboney, it makes sense for the Giboney principle to be used as
a justification for restricting such speech. Indeed, as Part I.G
suggests, aiding and abetting fits well the first part of the
Giboney framework: it helps cause some other nonspeech
273
Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1103
(2005).
274
Id. at 1174–80.
275
See United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 482 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Sattar, 395 F. Supp. 2d 79, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); State v. Coleman, 231
P.3d 212, 217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). But see McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.3d 626,
631–32 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that one criminal’s advice to another about how to
better run his gang is constitutionally protected); see also Stewart v. McCoy, 537
U.S. 993, 994–95 (2002) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (suggesting that perhaps such speech shouldn’t be protected).
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crime (in our hypothetical, burglary, drug manufacturing, or
the making or use of bombs).276 The Stevens principle that
speech is generally protected unless it fits within a traditionally
recognized exception thus doesn’t shield aiding and abetting
speech, such as the examples I gave above.
b. Limits on the Exception
Yet the second part of the Giboney framework is also critical here: courts need to recognize that the tendency of speech
to cause crime (here, by informing people how to commit crime)
is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition, for
restricting the speech. That is particularly true for speech that
is published to a large audience, and that can both inform or
persuade law-abiding readers and help some criminal readers
commit crimes.
A chemistry or engineering textbook, for instance, can provide information on how to create or use explosives, make
guns, or make drugs. A realistic novel can do the same. A
critic of drug law can explain just how easy certain drugs are to
make, as a means of persuading readers that banning those
drugs is a fool’s errand. A critic of ballistic identification systems or fingerprint recognition systems might criticize those
systems by explaining just how easy they are to deceive, information that criminals can also find useful.277
A newspaper might publish the name of a witness to a
crime, making it easier for criminals to retaliate against him. A
leaflet or a Web site might give the names and possibly the
addresses of boycott violators, abortion providers, strikebreakers, police officers, police informants, or registered sex offenders, thus facilitating (purposefully or not) attacks on such
people.
When and whether such speech should be restrictable is
an interesting and important question, which I’ve covered extensively elsewhere.278 As I mentioned above, some such
speech—such as advice given specifically to a particular wouldbe criminal—should indeed be punishable. Other speech,
such as publication of textbooks, novels, and newspaper sto276
See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 655–56
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Giboney as support for punishing speech that is essentially
aiding and abetting); Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon
Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 36 (Ct. App. 2006) (same).
277
For cases and other incidents corresponding to the examples in this paragraph and the next one, see Volokh, supra note 273, at 1097–1102.
278
See, e.g., id.

R
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ries, should generally not be punishable.279 Nor should it be
enough to conclude that the book or newspaper article was
published with the intent of promoting crime, for reasons I give
in the cited article.280
That such speech might be labeled “aiding and abetting”
cannot suffice to justify restricting it, just as labeling speech
that advocates breaking the law “solicitation” or “incitement”
doesn’t suffice to justify restricting it. Just as the Court has
narrowly cabined restrictions on crime-advocating speech in
cases such as Brandenburg v. Ohio, so courts need to come up
with rules indicating which restrictions on crime-facilitating
speech are permissible and which are forbidden. (I have elsewhere discussed at length how such rules might be defined.281)
Giboney itself doesn’t explain how these lines should be
drawn, just as it didn’t explain how the lines between punishable solicitation or incitement and protected advocacy should be
drawn. Simply relying on Giboney as authority for the proposition that speech (especially speech said to the public at large)
that “aids and abets” crime is unprotected just distracts from
the proper analysis.
This is why, I think, the Fourth Circuit erred in Rice v.
Paladin Enterprises, Inc., the famous “murder manual” case.282
In Rice, Paladin Enterprises had published “Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors,” which described how
contract killers could commit and get away with murder.283
James Perry killed three people using some of the information
he learned in the book.284 The victims’ relatives sued Paladin,
on the theory that their publishing the book tortiously aided
and abetted Perry.285
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Paladin could indeed be
held liable, if plaintiffs could show that Paladin published the
book with “the specific purpose of assisting and encouraging
commission of such conduct.”286 The court’s major argument
was based on Giboney, which the court summarized as supporting the view that “speech, which, in its effect, is tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct, may
itself be legitimately proscribed, punished, or regulated inci279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286

See generally id.
See id. at 1179–95.
See id. at 1097–1102.
128 F.3d 233, 266 (4th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 239, 253.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.
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dentally to the constitutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes.”287
Yet, as Part II.A noted, this position is not correct. Speech
is often constitutionally protected even when it is “tantamount
to legitimately proscribable”288 disturbance of the peace, contempt of court, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or
interference with business relations (in the sense that it tends
to bring about results made criminal or tortious by those legal
rules). Likewise, that aiding and abetting law is “generally applicable” to conduct as well as speech doesn’t tell us whether
this law may constitutionally be applied to speech precisely
because of what it communicates.289
B. Unsound Uses of Giboney, and Some Sound Refusals
to Use It
As Part II suggested, Giboney is easy to misread, especially
if the reader isn’t paying close attention to other First Amendment precedents. In particular, an exception for “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” might sound like it covers speech that
is itself defined to be illegal conduct. The same is true for the
statement that “it has never been deemed an abridgment of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part . . . carried out by
means of language.”290 A court might assume that, so long as
a law bans “conduct” generally, it can be freely applied to
speech as well, if the speech “carri[es] out” the forbidden
“conduct.”291
As Part II.A noted, that would be incorrect. The Court has
regularly deemed it an abridgment of free speech to make a
course of conduct illegal or tortious when the “conduct” consists of speech that supposedly causes harm because of what it
communicates. Yet many courts have missed this point. Let
me offer three categories of examples.
287

Id.
Id.
289
Id. The Justice Department report supporting the constitutionality of a
federal law restricting the distribution of bombmaking information, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 13, also relies on Giboney. I have criticized the Justice Department’s approach, which focuses on the author’s alleged purpose in distributing information that can help some readers commit crime. See Volokh, supra note
273, at 1179–94. But at least the Justice Department report recognizes that
Giboney simply opens the door for an aiding-and-abetting exception to the First
Amendment, and doesn’t itself define the scope of that exception.
290
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
291
Id.
288

R

R
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1. Criminal Harassment
Giboney often appears in court decisions that consider
whether speech may be punished as criminal harassment.
Criminal harassment statutes generally make it a crime to
communicate with the intent to “abuse,” “annoy,” “harass,”
“offend,” or “severe[ly] emotional[ly] distress” a particular person.292 Historically, such statutes have been focused on unwanted speech to a particular person, conveyed just to that
person (for instance, by a phone call, a letter, or an e-mail).293
But today, they are increasingly being used to restrict unwanted speech about the person, such as posts insulting the
person on the poster’s weblog, Facebook page, Twitter feed,
and the like.294
When such speech may be restricted is a difficult question,
on which I’ve written at length.295 I have generally argued that
unwanted one-to-one speech said to the person being insulted
or annoyed can indeed be restricted, because it is likely only to
offend or distress the target, and not to enlighten or inform
anyone. But speech said about a person, to third parties who
may be willing to hear it or to the public generally, must remain
protected—unless it falls into an existing unprotected category,
such as threats or false statements of fact—precisely because it
may persuade or inform willing listeners.
Yet however one draws this line, Giboney is largely unhelpful here. Speech that is intended to annoy, offend, or distress does not help cause or threaten other crimes, the way
solicitation or aiding or abetting does.296 It may itself be a way
of committing the crime of harassment, alongside nonspeech
292
Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and “Cyberstalking,” 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 740, 768–69 (2013).
293
See id. at 732–38.
294
See id.
295
See generally id. at 751–93.
296
Criminal harassment statutes that are limited to threats, of course, would
be constitutional under the threats exception. And statutes that ban false statements about the target that cause third parties to visit and possibly commit
crimes against the target—e.g., posting a message in an ex-girlfriend’s name that
purports to invite people to go to her house for sex, id. at 752 & n.102—would be
constitutional, too, as tailored to knowingly false statements that tend to cause
physical harm to particular people. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537,
2553–54 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that knowing
falsehoods that cause “specific harm to identifiable victims” are constitutionally
unprotected); id. at 2545 (plurality opinion) (likewise suggesting that knowing
falsehoods that produce “legally cognizable harm,” “such as an invasion of privacy,” are constitutionally punishable). I am speaking in the text about broader
criminal harassment statutes that have no such limitation and instead apply to
all speech intended to annoy, offend, or distress.
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conduct that constitutes the crime; but, as Part II.A notes, that
is not what the Giboney exception covers.
Consider, for instance, the lead opinion in State v. Thorne,
which rejected an overbreadth challenge to West Virginia’s telephone harassment law.297 Thorne was an anti-apartheid activist who had a longstanding acrimonious relationship with
Marshall University.298 After being suspended from the university, he called Marshall on a series of occasions:299
Each phone call started out in a civil manner. However,
at some point each turned unpleasant. One of Mr. Thorne’s
favorite subjects was Dr. Robert Hayes, former President of
Marshall University, who had just resigned.
He referred to Dr. Hayes as “the head hog,” and stated
that the “rest of the little piggies would get it.” Dr. Nell Bailey,
Dean of Student Affairs, testified that she was called “a bigot,
a racist pig.” Her secretary, Phyllis Caldwell, testified that
the defendant “referred to Dr. Hayes, who has been barbecued, and for the drippings, they’re going to fry the little
piggies who have been left behind.” Although these and other
witnesses explained the text of only four calls, they testified
to receiving numerous calls of a similar nature from Mr.
Thorne.300

Now, some of these statements might have been seen as
threatening, but Thorne wasn’t prosecuted on a threat theory.
Rather, he was prosecuted under a statute that barred making
“repeated telephone calls,” “with intent to harass or abuse another [person at the called number] by means of telephone.”301
Thorne contended the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, but the court upheld the statute, arguing as follows:
Prohibiting harassment is not prohibiting speech, because harassment is not a [sic] protected speech. Harassment is not communication, although it may take the form of
speech. The statute prohibits only telephone calls made with
297
333 S.E.2d 817, 819–20 (W. Va. 1985) (lead opinion). The lead opinion has
been treated as an opinion of the court, State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508, 512 n.5
(W. Va. 1996), and includes a syllabus by the Court which, in West Virginia, is
viewed as an authoritative statement of the law, and which is typically characteristic of majority opinions that announce binding law. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4;
State v. McKinley, 764 S.E.2d 303, 309 (W. Va. 2014); Walker v. Doe, 558 S.E.2d
290, 294 (W. Va. 2001), overruled on other grounds by McKinley. Nonetheless, the
lead opinion in Thorne was only signed by two Justices, with two others dissenting
and the fifth disqualified. 333 S.E.2d at 821 n.1 (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
298
Thorne, 333 S.E.2d at 818.
299
Id.
300
Id. at 819 (paragraph break added).
301
Id. at 819 & n.4 (plurality opinion) (quoting W. VA. CODE § 61-8-16(a)(4)
(1984)).
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the intent to harass. Phone calls made with the intent to
communicate are not prohibited.
Harassment, in this case, thus is not protected merely
because it is accomplished using a telephone. “[I]t has never
been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed.” Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965), quoting Giboney, 336 U.S.
490, 502 (1949). Because the statute does not prohibit communicative speech, we find that its proscription is not
overbroad.302

This is argument by assertion—by the kind of reliance on
“epithet[s]” and “mere labels” that the Court has condemned.303 The West Virginia court begins with the view that
“harassment,” which presumably means speech said with intent to harass or abuse the listener, is “not . . . protected
speech,” and indeed not even “communication.”304 And it then
turns to Giboney, via Cox, for the proposition that “a course of
conduct” may be prohibited even if “carried out by means of
language.”305
Yet surely statements made by phone are indeed “communication.” If they are “conduct,” they are only conduct in the
sense that all speech is also conduct. As the dissent acknowledged, other cases had indeed similarly upheld harassment
statutes “because the courts characterize the statutes as regulating harassing conduct and not the speech itself.”306 But, the
dissent concluded, “[t]hese cases have a sophistry that I find
302
Id. at 819–20 (paragraph break added) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted in part); see also Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559,
580 (5th Cir. 2005) (taking much the same approach, and likewise relying on
Giboney); Pontrich v. O’Reilly, No. 2004-CA-002580-MR, 2006 WL 1195897, at *2
(Ky. Ct. App. May 5, 2006) (likewise); State v. Hemmingway, 825 N.W.2d 303, 304,
308–10 (Wis. 2012) (likewise). For other cases that use the argument that harassing phone calls are “conduct, not speech,” see, e.g., Gormley v. Director, 632 F.2d
938, 941–42 (2d Cir. 1980); McKillop v. State, 857 P.2d 358, 363 (Alaska Ct. App.
1993); State v. Musser, 977 P.2d 131, 133 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc); State v. Brown,
85 P.3d 109, 113 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); Baker v. State, 494 P.2d 68, 70 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972); State v. Roesch, Nos. CR94-87735, CR94-87736 & CR94-90639,
1995 WL 356776, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 6, 1995); State v. Elder, 382 So. 2d
687, 690 (Fla. 1980); State v. Richards, 896 P.2d 357, 362 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995);
People v. Taravella, 350 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Lee, 917
P.2d 159, 162 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Alexander, 888 P.2d 175, 180
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
303
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1964).
304
Thorne, 333 S.E.2d at 819.
305
Id. (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965)).
306
Id. at 823 (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
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repugnant,” at least where “legitimate communication” is part
of the call.307
Of course, some forms of telephone harassment are indeed
intended to “abuse” or “harass” via the noncommunicative content of speech—for instance, calling someone in the middle of
the night precisely so his phone will ring and he will wake up,
without regard to what is said when he picks up the phone.
Such behavior can indeed be restricted using content-neutral
laws,308 just as loud speech in residential areas at night can be
restricted using content-neutral laws.309 But when telephone
harassment laws are applied to a telephone call precisely because it is the insulting words that are supposedly intended to
harass or abuse, the law certainly is a speech restriction.
Properly crafted telephone harassment laws may well be
constitutional. I’ve argued that unwanted speech said to a particular person when the speaker knows the speech is nearly
certain to be unwanted should often be constitutionally unprotected.310 But relabeling the speech “conduct,” and invoking
Giboney, doesn’t contribute to the analysis—it doesn’t help explain why the speech should be unprotected, or define the
boundaries of the lack of protection.
And this sort of relabeling of speech as conduct, for purposes of applying Giboney, continues to happen. In Commonwealth v. Johnson, for instance, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court cited Giboney in concluding that a harassment
statute could be applied to online speech about a person because “cyber harassment will consistently involve a hybrid of
speech and conduct.”311 “There is content within the communications” involved in the case, the court admitted, “but the
very act of using the Internet as a medium through which to
communicate implicates conduct.”312
Yet that’s a recipe for clandestinely denying full First
Amendment protection to all speech in all media. If “the very
act of using the Internet . . . implicates conduct” and thus
triggers lower protection, then a newspaper article likewise “implicates conduct” in the sense that a printing press or a computer printer has to put ink on paper, and oral communication
“implicates conduct” in the sense that larynxes vibrate and
307

Id. at 824.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.230(1)(b) (West 2010) (criminalizing,
among other things, telephone calls made “at an extremely inconvenient hour”).
309
See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78 (1949).
310
Volokh, supra note 292, at 740–51.
311
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 21 N.E.3d 937, 947 n.11 (Mass. 2014).
312
Id.
308

R
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mouths open and close. The speech in the Massachusetts case
might have been legitimately held unprotected on some
grounds—in that case, because it consisted of knowing falsehoods that intruded on a particular person.313 But it can’t be
distinguished from protected speech on the grounds that all
Internet communication is “conduct.”
Likewise, consider the 2014 decision in United States v.
Osinger, which upheld a conviction under federal stalking
law.314 Christopher Osinger, angry at an ex-girlfriend’s refusal
to restart their romantic relationship, started posting nude pictures of the ex-girlfriend on Facebook and sending them to her
coworkers.315 As I’ve noted elsewhere, such speech likely is
punishable under a narrow and specific revenge porn
statute.316
But the basis for punishing the speech cannot be, in the
Ninth Circuit’s words, that “[a]ny expressive aspects of Osinger’s speech were not protected under the First Amendment
because they were ‘integral to criminal conduct’ in intentionally
harassing, intimidating or causing substantial emotional distress” to his ex-girlfriend.317 Under this rationale, any repeated online speech—including public political ridicule of
politicians, journalists, businesspeople, religious figures, and
others—that intentionally causes substantial emotional distress would be constitutionally unprotected.
After all, the federal stalking ban is not at all limited to
revenge porn; it bars any “course of conduct [using mail or
interactive computer services] that causes substantial emotional distress to [a] person” with intent to “harass . . . [and]
cause substantial emotional distress to [that] person.”318 A
modern version of the Hustler v. Falwell parody319 posted online (and posted more than once, to satisfy the “course of conduct” requirement) might well be covered by the ban. So could
313

See supra note 296.
753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014).
315
See id. at 942.
316
Eugene Volokh, Florida “Revenge Porn” Bill, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 10,
2013, 7:51 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/04/10/florida-revenge-porn-bill/
[http://perma.cc/S7KH-TWC5]; Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad
Purposes, 63 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 47, pt. IV.C.2) (on
file with author).
317
Osinger, 753 F.3d at 947 (citing United States v. Meredith, 685 F.3d 814,
819–20 (9th Cir. 2012)).
318
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2012).
319
For a description of the parody, see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 48 (1988).
314

R
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a vast range of other ridicule or denunciation, whether of public officials, political or religious leaders, or private citizens.
After all, many political attacks, especially if they are successful in revealing their target’s misdeeds, can inflict substantial emotional distress. The loss of a place of honor, or even the
prospect of such a loss, is naturally extremely distressing. So
is the sense that hundreds of thousands of people are being
persuaded to view you with contempt.
And many of the most effective attacks come from people
who have long been the target’s enemy, whether those people
are politicians who have fought with the target, or journalists
or activists who have long viewed the target as dishonest or
evil. Those speakers may well be seen as speaking with the
intent of substantially distressing the target (likely intertwined
with other motivations). Under the terms of the federal statute,
there is nothing to keep this statute from covering such “conduct” in the form of repeated public ridicule, release of damaging facts about the target, and the like.
Moreover, as a result, even people who might have a purely
public-spirited motive might be deterred from speaking for fear
that they will be criminally prosecuted by a prosecutor who
suspects their motives to be bad. As the Court noted in rejecting criminal libel liability for true statements said with a
supposed “bad motive,”
[d]ebate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the
speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that
he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred,
utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.320

And under a rule allowing criminal punishment “based on an
intent merely to inflict harm, . . . ’it becomes a hazardous
matter to speak out against a popular politician, with the result
that the dishonest and incompetent will be shielded.’”321
Indeed, a person was recently prosecuted for posting hundreds of Twitter messages ridiculing and insulting a Buddhist
religious leader, though the district court dismissed the indictment on First Amendment grounds.322 And similar state statutes have been used to prosecute people who say harsh things

320

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
Id. at 73–74 (quoting Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 893 (1949)).
322
United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011).
321
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about political officials, writers, businesspeople, and others, or
to enjoin people from saying such harsh things.323
Such prosecutions can’t be constitutional. Yet if one accepts the Osinger, Johnson, and Thorne use of Giboney as a
basis for holding such speech unprotected—relabeling the
speech as “conduct”—then the prosecutions would indeed be
permissible. Reliance on Giboney thus distracts courts from
the right questions (such as whether revenge porn, or knowingly false and distressing statements about particular people,
should be constitutionally unprotected).324
Fortunately, some courts have recognized the error of categorically upholding criminal harassment laws. I already cited
above the two-Justice dissenting opinion in Thorne v. Bailey.
Likewise, two recent decisions by New York’s highest court
struck down an overbroad criminal harassment law;325 one of
them also upheld a much narrower ban on knowingly false
online impersonation.326 A recent New Jersey appellate decision likewise made clear that criminal harassment law is limited by the First Amendment, at least when the speech is said
about a person rather than to him.327
And a 2015 federal district court decision in a criminal
harassment case expressly recognized that “it is important that
[the court] avoid interpreting Giboney’s exception too broadly”:
“Under the broadest interpretation [of Giboney], if the government criminalized any type of speech, then anyone engaging in
323

See Volokh, supra note 292, at 732–40 (discussing several such cases).
The Ninth Circuit in Osinger also reasoned that the speech was unprotected “for the additional reason that it involved sexually explicit publications
concerning a private individual,” partly because “‘the public has no legitimate
interest in the private sexual activities of [the victim] or in the embarrassing facts
revealed about her life.’” 753 F.3d at 948 (quoting United States v. Petrovic, 701
F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original)). This is the sort of rationale
that I think would be sound—though as to a narrowly defined statute, not the
broad section 2261A ban on any repeated speech (revenge porn or otherwise) that
intentionally causes serious emotional distress. But the criticism in the text is
addressed to the Ninth Circuit’s independent Giboney-based rationale for sustaining the conviction.
325
People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 484–88 (N.Y. 2014); People v. Golb,
15 N.E.3d 805, 813–14 (N.Y. 2014). Marquan M. mentioned the exception for
“statements integral to criminal conduct,” 19 N.E.3d at 485, but concluded that
criminal harassment law wasn’t limited to such statements; the court distinguished “statutes that criminalized conduct—repeated telephone harassment and
stalking—without regard to the content of any communication,” and concluded
that a law punishing speech “based on the communicative message that the
accused intends to convey” using “the offensive words he wrote on Facebook” had
to be evaluated under strict scrutiny, id. at 488 n.4.
326
Golb, 15 N.E.3d at 811–13.
327
State v. Burkert, No. A-5103-13T3, 2016 N.J. Super. LEXIS 42, at *15 (N.J.
App. Div. Mar. 18, 2016).
324

R
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that speech could be punished because the speech would automatically be integral to committing the offense. That interpretation would clearly be inconsistent with the First Amendment
and [later cases].”328 That is sound advice, which other courts
ought to heed.
2. Professional-Client Speech
Giboney has likewise been misused in some recent professional-client speech cases. When professional-client speech
should be constitutionally protected is a longstanding mystery
of First Amendment law.329 But, again, Giboney does not really
help clear up this mystery.
When lawyers, doctors, psychotherapists, financial planners, and other professionals advise clients, they are speaking.330 Yet such speech has traditionally been subject to
regulation, for instance, through licensing requirements,331
malpractice liability for negligent advice,332 and compelled disclosures.333 And some subjects that professionals might dis328

United States v. Matusiewicz, 84 F. Supp. 3d. 363, 369 (D. Del. 2015).
See generally Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639 (2011); Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”:
Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885 (2000);
Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV.
FORUM 183 (2015); Warren Geoffrey Tucker, It’s Not Called Conduct Therapy; Talk
Therapy as a Protected Form of Speech Under the First Amendment, 23 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 885 (2015). This extends both to the rules applicable to regulations of professional-client speech and to the judgment about which speakers
count as less protected “professional[s].” Compare, e.g., Moore-King v. Cty. of
Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 569–70 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholding restriction on
fortune-tellers using a relatively low level of scrutiny, on the grounds that they are
professional counselors), with Nefedro v. Montgomery Cty., 996 A.2d 850, 862–63
(Md. 2010) (striking down such a restriction under strict scrutiny, and not invoking the professional-client speech doctrine); see also Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d
1185, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that interior decorators’ aesthetic
advice to clients is regulable professional-client speech).
330
I focus here on professionals who don’t engage in physical conduct (such
as surgery), and don’t engage in communications that themselves create legally
significant rights or obligations (such as filing court documents or writing
prescriptions).
331
See, e.g., N.D. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 5.5(d) (2012) (“A lawyer who is not
admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not represent or hold out to the
public that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.”); 63 PA.
STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 422.10 (West 2010) (“No person other than a medical
doctor shall [practice medicine and surgery] except as authorized or exempted in
this act . . . .”).
332
See, e.g., Me. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.1 (2015) (requiring lawyers to
provide “competent representation to . . . client[s]”).
333
See, e.g., Ala. Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl., Scope (“In reliance on the
attorney-client privilege, clients are entitled to expect that communications within
the scope of the privilege will be protected against compelled disclosure.”).
329
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cuss are sometimes specially targeted for regulation: for
instance, a lawyer counseling a client about whether to file
bankruptcy,334 a doctor talking to patients about what the doctor sees as the dangers of gun possession,335 or a psychotherapist teaching patients techniques that can supposedly help
them suppress their attraction to members of the same sex.336
All these regulations would be clearly unconstitutional as
to the speech of, say, journalists, book authors, or documentarians. The law can’t require, for instance, a license to publish
history books. The law can’t hold financial reporters liable for
supposedly negligent research and published recommendations. But it’s generally understood that professionals’ speech
advising a specific client about the client’s individual problems
can be subject to greater restriction.337
Just what sorts of restrictions are permissible, though?
The Supreme Court has never squarely answered this. Justice
White’s concurring opinion in Lowe v. SEC, however, suggested
that Giboney should help guide the analysis:
The power of government to regulate the professions is not
lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech. The
underlying principle was expressed by the Court in
Giboney . . . : “it has never been deemed an abridgment of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed.”338

And the Ninth Circuit, in upholding a ban on sexual orientation
conversion therapy of minors, echoed this:
[As to] regulation of professional conduct, . . . the state’s
power is great, even though such regulation may have an
incidental effect on speech. . . . “Just as offer and acceptance
334
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229,
323–33 (2010) (upholding such a restriction, though reading it narrowly as limited to lawyers’ advising clients to break the law).
335
See Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 797 F.3d 859, 869 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding such a restriction).
336
See King v. Governor, 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding such a
restriction); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2013) (same).
337
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(lead opinion) (upholding a requirement that abortion providers convey certain
information to patients before performing an abortion); id. at 967 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (likewise concluding that this requirement was constitutional,
though without expressly discussing the First Amendment issue); Nat’l Ass’n for
the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043,
1046 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding a licensing requirement for psychotherapists).
338
472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
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are communications incidental to the regulable transaction
called a contract, the professional’s speech is incidental to
the conduct of the profession.” . . . [A]n application of the
First Amendment [to restrictions on medical and mental
health treatments that involve speech] would restrict unduly
the states’ power to regulate licensed professions and would
be inconsistent with the principle that “it has never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed.” Giboney, 336
U.S. at 502.339

But that can’t be the right analysis. When a psychotherapist counsels a patient about how the patient can (supposedly)
suppress his same-sex sexual attraction, the psychotherapist
is not promoting or threatening any separate crime or tort. He
is just conveying advice, or teaching a patient how to avoid
some legal behavior and to engage in other legal behavior
instead.
He may be doing this over an extended set of interactions (a
“course of conduct” in that sense of the phrase), but that does
not make the speech regulable. A constitutionally protected
lecture does not become unprotected when it becomes a lecture
series. Advocacy of a political boycott does not become unprotected just because it consists of a “course of conduct” that
includes speaking, gathering names of people who aren’t complying with the boycott, and publicizing those names.340
In all these cases, including in the professional-client
speech case, there is no “course of conduct” apart from a
course of speech. We can call the speech “professional consultation” or “psychotherapy,” but speech is all that it is. Just as
the proposed offering of advice to terrorist groups about their
international legal options was treated as speech in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, so the proposed offering of advice to
a patient should be treated as speech as well. Indeed, the
Court’s analysis of the speech offering advice about law in
Holder carries over quite closely:
339
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Giboney,
336 U.S. at 502); see also Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228
F.3d at 1053–54 (citing Giboney to support the proposition that licensing requirement for psychoanalysts is constitutional); People v. Shell, 148 P.3d 162, 173
(Colo. 2006) (same for lawyers); Accountants’ Ass’n of La. v. State, 533 So. 2d
1251, 1254–55 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (same for accountants).
340
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909–10 (1982).
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The Government is wrong that the only thing actually at issue in this litigation is conduct [rather than speech] . . . .
Plaintiffs want to speak to the [terrorist groups], and whether
they may do so under [the statute] depends on what they
say. . . .
The Government argues that [the statute] should nonetheless receive intermediate scrutiny because it generally
functions as a regulation of conduct. . . . The law here may
be described as directed at conduct, as the law in Cohen was
directed at breaches of the peace, but as applied to plaintiffs
the conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of
communicating a message. . . . “If [the law is related to expression], then we are outside of O’Brien’s test, and we must
[apply] a more demanding standard.”341

The same is true of the conversion therapy ban. As the Third
Circuit pointed out in dealing with such a ban in King v.
Governor,
Given that the Supreme Court had no difficulty characterizing legal counseling as “speech,” we see no reason here
to reach the counter-intuitive conclusion that the verbal
communications that occur during SOCE counseling are
“conduct.” Defendants’ citation to Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co. does not alter our conclusion. . . .
[The Court’s statement that “it has never been deemed an
abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of
conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed”] has been the subject of much
confusion. Yet whatever may be Giboney’s meaning or scope,
Humanitarian Law Project makes clear that verbal or written
communications, even those that function as vehicles for delivering professional services, are “speech” for purposes of the
First Amendment.342

As the Third Circuit further explained, “the enterprise of labeling certain verbal or written communications ‘speech’ and
others ‘conduct’ is unprincipled and susceptible to
manipulation”:
For instance, consider a sophomore psychology major
who tells a fellow student that he can reduce same-sex attractions by avoiding effeminate behaviors and developing a
closer relationship with his father. Surely this advice is not
341
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2010) (citations
omitted) (last alteration in original) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403
(1989).
342
767 F.3d 216, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (quoting Giboney,
336 U.S. at 502 (citations omitted)).
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“conduct” . . . . Yet it would be strange indeed to conclude
that the same words, spoken with the same intent, somehow
become “conduct” when the speaker is a licensed counselor.
That the counselor is speaking as a licensed professional may
affect the level of First Amendment protection her speech
enjoys, but this fact does not transmogrify her words into
“conduct.”
As another example, a law student who tries to convince
her friend to change his political orientation is assuredly
“speaking” for purposes of the First Amendment, even if she
uses particular rhetorical “methods” in the process.343

“To classify some communications as ‘speech’ and others as
‘conduct’ is to engage in nothing more than a ‘labeling
game.’”344
The Eleventh Circuit’s Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida
decision likewise rejected the “regulation of conduct, not
speech” argument as a basis for upholding a restriction on
doctors’ speech to patients about guns:
[This] begs the question we must answer here. An inhibition
of professionals’ freedom of speech does not violate the First
Amendment “so long as” it is “merely the incidental effect of
. . . an otherwise legitimate regulation.” The State’s [“conduct, not speech”] analysis proceeds at such a high level of
generality that all laws regulating the practice of a profession
would necessarily impose only incidental burdens on speech,
and so would always pass muster under the First Amendment. This cannot be the case. . . .
Indeed, Justice White [in his Lowe v. SEC concurrence,
on which the State relies,] recognized that “[a]t some point, a
measure is no longer a regulation of a profession but a regulation of speech or of the press; beyond that point, the statute
must survive the level of scrutiny demanded by the First
Amendment.” . . . [S]ee also Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (explaining that when “the conduct triggering coverage under [a] statute consists of communicating a message . . . we must [apply] a more demanding
standard” of scrutiny than that applied to regulations of
343

Id. at 228 (paragraph break added).
Id.; see also Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc):
The Supreme Court’s implication in Humanitarian Law Project is
clear: legislatures cannot nullify the First Amendment’s protections
for speech by playing this labeling game. SB 1172 prohibits certain
“practices,” just as the statute in Humanitarian Law Project prohibited “material support”; but with regard to those plaintiffs as well as
the plaintiffs here, those laws targeted speech. Thus, the First
Amendment still applies.
344
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Some restrictions on professional-client speech may well
be constitutional—for instance, because clients are particularly likely to put their physical, psychological, or financial
well-being at risk when relying on the expertise of the professionals. Indeed, the Third Circuit so held in King and upheld
the restriction on conversion therapy of minors.346 Likewise,
an Eleventh Circuit panel decision concluded that professional-client speech should nonetheless be treated as less protected (for reasons unconnected to Giboney), and upheld the
restriction on gun-related questions involved in that case.347
Moreover, professional-client speech that, say, aids a client in
committing a crime might well qualify under the Giboney exception, properly understood.348
But the explanation for any broad lack of protection for
professional-client speech must come from something other
than a “conduct, not speech” argument—just as the explanation for exceptions such as defamation comes from something
other than labeling the speech “conduct.” As the Court said in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
In deciding the question [of constitutional limitations upon
the power to award damages for libel of a public official], we
are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any
more weight to the epithet “libel” than we have to other “mere
labels” of state law. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of
unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of
legal business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this court,
libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
345
797 F.3d 859, 884–85 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (quoting Locke v.
Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011)).
346
767 F.3d at 246.
347
Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 899–900. The opinion declined to treat the
speech as conduct, which I think is quite right (though I disagree with the court’s
substantive First Amendment analysis, see Eugene Volokh, Court Upholds Florida
Law Restricting Doctor-Patient Speech About Guns, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(July 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2015/07/29/court-upholds-restriction-on-doctor-patient-speech-aboutguns/ [https://perma.cc/WZG4-UQ9G/]). A later panel decision in the same
case concluded that the speech restriction passed strict scrutiny even if no specially reduced protection for professional-client speech was applicable. No. 1214009, 2015 WL 8639875 (11th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015). The case is now being
reheard en banc. Order, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., No. 12-14009 (11th
Cir. Feb. 3, 2016).
348
See supra Part III.A.3.
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limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy
the First Amendment.349

The same is true of labels such as “the practice of a profession”—or, more generally, “conduct.”
3. Blackmail
Let me close with one more example: blackmail, in the
sense of threats to reveal information about someone unless he
does something the speaker wants. When and why blackmail
should be criminally punishable is a famously difficult question.350 So is when and why blackmail should be stripped of
First Amendment protection.351
But whatever the answer might be, it can’t just be that
there is a criminal law prohibiting blackmail. Consider, for
instance, Gerhart v. State, a recent decision of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals.352 Al Gerhart, a political activist,
sent a state senator a letter saying,
Get that bill heard or I will make sure you regret not doing it.
I will make you the laughing stock of the Senate if I don’t hear
that this bill will be heard and passed. We will dig into your
past, [your] family, your associates and once we start on you
there will be no end to it.353

For this, Gerhart was prosecuted for blackmail: “[t]hreatening
to expose any fact, report or information concerning any person
which would in any way subject such person to the ridicule or
contempt of society” “with intent . . . to compel another to do an
act.”354
Whether this should qualify as blackmail, and thus lose
constitutional protection, is an interesting question. Telling a
real estate agent to “stop engaging in ‘panic peddling’ or we’ll
publicize your behavior to your neighbors and fellow church
members” is protected by the First Amendment.355 “The claim
that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the
349

376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 670, 670–71 (1984); Peter Westen, Why the Paradox of Blackmail Is So
Hard to Resolve, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 585 (2012).
351
See, e.g., Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1442–43 (9th Cir. 1983); State v.
Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 578 (Or. 1982); GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 90–92.
352
No. F–2014–726, 2015 WL 5853981 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 2015). This
court is Oklahoma’s highest court for criminal matters.
353
Id. at *1.
354
Id. at *3.
355
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 417, 419–20 (1971).
350

R
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First Amendment.”356 Likewise, telling black citizens “stop
shopping at white-owned stores or we’ll publicize your behavior
to your neighbors and fellow church members” is similarly constitutionally protected.357
On the other hand, “vote for this civil rights bill or I’ll disclose that you cheated on your wife” is likely unprotected. I
know of no clear answer as to how the law would deal with a
general threat to uncover some unspecified dirt in the future,
as in Gerhart.
Yet wherever the line is to be drawn between constitutionally protected and unprotected political threats, that line can’t
simply turn on whether the threat is covered by a criminal law
banning blackmail. The Gerhart dissent, which would have
upheld Gerhart’s conviction, reasoned that “[t]he majority admits that speech integral to criminal conduct is not protected
by the First Amendment. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). Gerhart’s communication clearly
meets the statutory requirement for blackmail.”358 Yet that
can’t be the right analysis.
The majority’s approach in Gerhart was better, because it
properly read Giboney as limited to speech that promotes some
other crime, rather than just the speech crime that the speaker
is accused of committing:
The State asserts the email is “speech integral to criminal
conduct” and thus not constitutionally protected[, relying on
Giboney]. . . .
The facts of the present case are distinguishable. Appellant’s email did not urge or compel the Senator to violate the
law or commit an unlawful act, nor was it sent with the intent
to compel the Senator to violate the law. The email was sent
with the intent to convince the Senator to change his mind on
a political issue.359

Instead, the majority looked to the scope of the “true threats”
exception to the First Amendment, and decided that this particular speech didn’t fall within the scope of that exception.
The majority might or might not have been right on that question. But considering the proper scope of the “true threats”
exception is the right approach; simply assuming that the
356

Id. at 419.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910–12 (1982).
358
Gerhart, 2015 WL 5853981, at *8 (Smith, P.J., dissenting) (citation omitted
in part); see also United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 854–55 (8th Cir. 2012)
(likewise unhelpfully citing Giboney in a blackmail case); State v. Strong, 272 P.3d
281, 286 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (likewise).
359
Gerhart, 2015 WL 5853981, at *2–3.
357
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speech is unprotected because it violates the blackmail statute
is not.
CONCLUSION
The best way of understanding the “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” exception, consistent with the other First Amendment precedents, is this:360
1. When certain nonspeech conduct is criminal or tortious—e.g., murder, child sexual abuse, restraint of trade, employment discrimination—certain speech that tends to cause
or threaten the commission of such conduct in certain ways
can likewise be made criminal or tortious.361
2. Several existing exceptions have historically been understood as special cases of this doctrine: the exceptions for
solicitation, fighting words, child pornography, threats, and
conspiracy. Likewise, this doctrine can help explain why
speech may sometimes be punished on the grounds that it
consists of an attempt to commit crime (or preparation for such
crime), or that it aids and abets people in committing crime.
3. This doctrine lets courts effectively carve out First
Amendment exceptions, including for relatively new laws, such
as bans on child pornography—even though the Court concluded in United States v. Stevens that only historically supported First Amendment exceptions can be recognized. In this
respect, the function of the Giboney exception today is similar
to its function to Justice Black, who wrote Giboney itself. Justice Black often said that there are no First Amendment exceptions at all, but nonetheless recognized exceptions for threats,
fighting words, and solicitation under the theory that they involve speech that is integral to illegal conduct.362 Both then
and now, the doctrine has been a safety valve that in effect
limits the absolutism of seemingly absolutist First Amendment
approaches.
4. But even when speech does tend to cause or threatens
illegal conduct, the boundaries of any exception for that speech
need to be defined by the courts with an eye towards making
sure that the exception doesn’t unduly suppress protected
speech (just as the Court has done for the incitement, fighting
words, and child pornography exceptions).363 Giboney doesn’t
itself define those boundaries.
360
361
362
363

See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra

Part I.G.
Part I.
Part I.H.
Parts I.A.2, I.B.2, I.C.2, I.D.2, III.A.2.b & III.A.3.b.
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5. The “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” exception cannot be triggered just by speech itself being a violation of a law,
even a law that bans conduct as well as speech.364 Laws banning speech that seriously distresses a particular person, for
instance, or regulating professional-client speech, cannot be
defended under this exception.365 Those laws regulate speech,
and if such speech may sometimes be restricted, that has to be
done under some other rationale.
I am not fond of Giboney, a broadly and imprecisely written
decision that has often been misinterpreted.366 I wish that the
Court hadn’t revived it, and had instead dealt with these questions in some other way.
But Giboney and the “speech integral to [illegal] conduct”
exception seems to be here to stay. This summary, I hope, can
help explain it and keep it “well-defined and narrowly limited,”
as the Court has directed.367

364

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.B.
366
See Volokh, supra note 17.
367
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (quoting Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)).
365

R

